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Before Thomas More's life ended, he uttered the following
famous last words: "'I die the king's good servant, and God's
first.' "1 The phrase, while brief, is a window through which one
can view More's philosophy, legal career, and service as a judge
under the regime of King Henry VIII. Roughly twenty years
earlier, More, in his finest and most widely known work, Utopia,2
advocated perseverance through prudence to public servants
facing moral difficulty: "Don't give up the ship in a storm
because you cannot direct the winds. [W]hat you cannot turn to
good, you may at least-to the extent of your powers-make less
bad."3 These lines, demonstrating the tension between serving in
a system of imperfect human law while trying to remain the loyal
servant of an unearthly yet divine kingdom, also serve as
bookends for More's life and philosophy. More's life-and death
for that matter-personifies the emergence of modern
philosophies of law that ultimately prioritize positive law without
reference to unwritten norms. The events surrounding his public
legal career and his responses to those events demonstrate the
t J.D. 2011, magna cum laude, Notre Dame Law School; B.A. 2008, Philosophy
and Political Science, summa cum laude, Villanova University. I would also like to
extend a heartfelt thank you to Katherine Murray, my parents, and my brothers and
sisters-in-law for their unconditional love, continuous patience, unyielding support,
and enduring encouragement.
IA THOMAS MORE SOURCEBOOK 357 (Gerard B. Wegemer & Stephen W. Smith
eds., 2004).
2 SIR THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA (Robert M. Adams ed. & trans., 2d ed. 1992)
(1975).
3 Id. at 26.
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arduous task of prudently pursuing the common good while
remaining true to cardinal principles, assuming one chooses to
hold and act on behalf of them.'
More's legal career, in all of its different capacities, displays
the perpetual dialogue between the inherent values of the
natural law tradition and the primacy of positive law in legal
positivism, including each system's most basic assumptions. He
lived in an aristocratic England familiar with Catholic
philosophy yet dominated by the ideas of humanists such as
Erasmus;' further, anti-authority polemicists like Martin Luther
and William Tyndale emerged to express the seeds of modern
skepticism, albeit from a theological perspective. William
Occam's prioritization of the will, especially God's will, had
radical implications for the philosophical assumptions underlying
the changing legal system during More's life. This exchange of
ideas pervaded his service as a judge and culminated in his
eventual conflict with King Henry VIII.
Put simply, More's life and legal career is an example of the
prudent pursuit of traditional notions of virtue and justice within
an era dominated by new ideas about the nature of law and
justice in political systems. His jurisprudence implicitly
acknowledges the validity of the natural law tradition while
paying special attention to the virtue of prudence in public
affairs. The natural law tradition pervades More's career as a
lawyer and public servant and is the key to understanding his
jurisprudence. Saint Thomas Aquinas, who lived roughly two
centuries earlier, articulated this understanding of the virtue of
prudence.' More continuously attempted to remain cognizant of
the particular circumstances in which he had to make decisions,
including his place and role in the wider legal system. In other
words, he consistently strived to understand and apply the right
principles in the right way, while recognizing the limitations of
his different offices and the other actors around him.
4 Adherence to moral principle, founded on more than expedience, is something
that legal positivism lacks and is one reason More's contemporaries failed to
understand his motivation for acting the way he did.
See DEREK WILSON, ENGLAND IN THE AGE OF THOMAS MORE 1-2 (1978).
6 See HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 226-27 (Thomas R. Hanley trans., 1998) ("For prudence
combines the knowledge of general principles with the knowledge of particulars
which are the matter of action, since it governs the right choice of means for
attaining the end.").
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For More, law was a holistic endeavor built from various
disciplines reflecting on human nature.' His contemporaries
could not fully accept More's acknowledgment of the limitations
of human governance and the compelling force of the natural law
in the Christian tradition, as well as his unyielding devotion to
his conscience." In this sense, More's death is a product of the
inherent conflict between differing jurisprudential perspectives-
including the unchecked force of law founded on will rather than
reason that is characteristic of modern positivism. As one
scholar notes, More "was fundamentally a man at odds with his
age."9
I. MORE'S BACKGROUND' 0
Thomas More was born the son of a lawyer. His father, Sir
John More, served on the King's Bench Court, and More thought
he was a great man." Young More grew to possess similar
qualities as his father, including his sense of humor, work ethic,
and sharp judgment. 2 As a child More worked as a page for
John Morton, the Archbishop of Canterbury; Morton reportedly
predicted that More would grow to become "a marvelous man."1
Perhaps anticipating his future career, Morton sent him to the
University of Oxford to study Latin and logic.'4 He returned to
London after completing his studies at Oxford and began to
follow his father in the profession of law. But More's confidence
in his legal vocation wavered; he contemplated leaving the legal
' See GERARD B. WEGEMER, THOMAS MORE: A PORTRAIT OF COURAGE 48 (3d
prtg. 1998) [hereinafter WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE] ("[H]e well understood
that law, like most other professions, requires for its proper execution the
philosopher's understanding of human nature, the rhetorician's art in directing the
emotions, the diplomat's skill in counsel and negotiation, and the historian's
understanding of tradition.").
8 See infra Parts III.A, III.C.
9 WILSON, supra note 5, at 235.
10 This is a brief biographical sketch for purposes of organization and context.
The rest of the Article will use some of these anecdotes, occurrences, and events, as
well as others from throughout More's life, to elucidate his philosophy and
jurisprudence.
n1 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 4 ("Thomas described
his father as an 'affable man, charming, irreproachable, gentle, sympathetic, honest,
and upright.' ").
" See id.
1 Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
" See id.; Thomas More - Biography, EUROPEAN GRADUATE SCH.,
http://www.egs.edullibrary/thomas-more/biography/ (last modified June 2, 2013).
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profession to become a monk in either the Carthusian or
Franciscan order." Yet after only a few years of studying law at
his father's side, he became a barrister in 1501.16 While studying
law, More also engaged in studying literature, history,
philosophy, rhetoric, and theology, and maintained a special
interest in political philosophy." During this time, More also
developed the spiritual practices that he would maintain for the
rest of his life.18
Settled in the legal profession, More became a member of
England's Parliament in 1504, where he argued so forcefully
against a subsidy proposed by King Henry VII that the King
imprisoned More's father." He was not a bachelor politician for
long; he married Jane Colt a year later.20 They had four children
between that date and her death in 1511.21 More remarried a
woman named Alice Middleton immediately; she was older and
wealthier at the time of their marriage." They had no children
together, although More accepted Middleton's daughter from a
prior marriage as his own.23 More provided a classical education
to his children, including his daughters.2 4
His reputation as a lawyer soon began to spread. His fellow
citizens commended him for his honesty and integrity. One early
biographer notes how More was always straightforward and
frank with his clients. Erasmus recalled how More was selfless
when acting on behalf of his clients.2 ' His first position as a
"6 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 14-15; EUROPEAN
GRADUATE SCH., supra note 14.
16 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 48-49.
17 See id. at 13. He also studied Greek so he could read the original classics. Id.
at 49. More even lectured on Saint Augustine's City of God at the age of twenty-
three. Id. at 13-14.
18 See id. at 15. Some scholars claim that More engaged in self-mortification by
wearing a "hair shirt." Id. He also apparently fasted regularly. Id.
1 See id. at 50-51.
2 See id. at 28.
21 See id. at 30.
22 See id. at 30-31. More married Middleton thirty days after his first wife's
death. She was six years older than him.
23 See A THOMAS MORE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 321.
24 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 50, 79-91. More
considered studying the humanities central to a good education.
26 See THOMAS STAPLETON, THE LIFE AND ILLUSTRIOUS MARTYRDOM OF SIR
THOMAS MORE 15 (E.E. Reynolds ed., Philip E. Hallett trans., 1966).
26 See DESIDERIUs ERASMUS, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ERASMUS: LETTERS 993
TO 1121, 1519 TO 1520 22 (R.A.B. Mynors trans., 1987) (1974).
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judge came in 1510 when he became an undersheriff in London.27
While he served as an undersheriff, he argued numerous cases in
the Star Chamber.2 " His salary was small but he gained ample
knowledge of social problems: "[He] act[ed] with integrity, and
with kindness to the unfortunate."29  He became a Master of
Requests four years later, and by 1517 he formally entered the
king's service, albeit reluctantly.o Serving as Master of Requests
was perhaps More's favorite position because it involved the
causes of the lower classes, including the poorest members of
society.3' But More foresaw the difficulties that came with public
service at the highest levels: "More realized from his own study
of history and of human nature that even the best of kings could
become a tyrant."3 2 He was reluctant to accept the new position
out of fear for the unchecked will of a ruler; little did he know
that this fear would develop into reality only a little more than a
decade later. Ironically, King Henry VIII reportedly told More to
obey God first and him second.
In the next three years, he became a knight, under-
treasurer, and most significantly, the secretary and personal
adviser to King Henry VIII, thereby starting one of the most
famous royal relationships in English history.34 He also served
judicially when he heard many of the cases brought before the
King. 5 While Secretary, he served as liaison between the King
and Cardinal Wolsey, the powerful Archbishop of York. In 1523,
More became Speaker of the House of Commons."
27 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 54-55.
28 See WILLIAM ROPER & NICHOLAS HARPSFIELD, LIVES OF SAINT THOMAS MORE
65 (E.E. Reynolds ed., 1978).
29 RUSSELL AMES, CITIZEN THOMAS MORE AND His UTOPIA 44 (1949).
3o See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 70-72.
31 See WILSON, supra note 5, at 110.
32 WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 71. More also had other
concerns, including losing time to spend with his family, his academic and writing
career, and the allure of pride, which he did not consider himself immune from. Id.
32 See id. at 72.
34 Id. at 76.
*' See id. at 74.
36 Id. at 76.
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Two years later, More received significant judicial and
administrative power when the King named him Chancellor of
the Duchy of Lancaster." He governed Duchy lands and finances
and served as an equity judge." A rhyme of unknown origin, but
from that time, reads:
When More sometime had Chancellor been,
No more suits did remain.
The like will never more be seen
Till More be there again.39
This lower chancellor post served as the stepping-stone to his
eventual ascension to the position of Lord Chancellor, which was
the last government position he ever held. He succeeded
Cardinal Wolsey, who had fallen out of favor with the King.40 His
chief responsibility was to serve as the chief justice of England.
Legal historian John Guy claims that More handled close to a
thousand cases per year.4 1 More attempted to follow his
conscience by doing what he determined was right while in the
position.42 As the head of the court of equity he could decide
cases based on right and wrong:
More had some opportunity to apply those principles and beliefs
which, in his opinion, lay behind the written law and went to
the heart of real justice. As More sat in his marble chair in
Westminster Hall he had to give judgement [sic] not in
accordance with statute or strict legal precedent but with
regard only to natural justice, common sense and common
fairness.4 3
Though his primary responsibilities were judicial, More also
tried to make peace, although he arguably contributed to the fire
a See id. at 106.
38 See id. There are records of over three hundred cases from his court.
9 Margaret Hastings, Sir Thomas More: Maker of English Law?, in ESSENTIAL
ARTICLES FOR THE STUDY OF THOMAS MORE 104, 110 (G.P. Marc'hadour & R.S.
Sylvester eds., 1977).
40 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 134.
41 See id. at 135.
42 See J.A. Guy, THE PUBLIC CAREER OF SIR THOMAS MORE 79 (1980) (More
cultivated "a distinctive policy of self-involvement, scrupulousness and
discretion... . [H]is great contribution was exactly this: to rejuvenate the ancient
theory that judges had a personal duty in conscience to see right done by all whose
business was entertained in the courts they directed").
4 WILSON, supra note 5, at 155.
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by fiercely defending the Church." His tenure as Lord
Chancellor also saw "what was to be known as the most
revolutionary parliament in England's history."4 1
The next five years consisted of numerous events that are
partially, if not completely, responsible for his execution. The
downward spiral began when More refused to sign a letter asking
the Pope to annul the King's marriage. Then he refused to take
an oath recognizing the King as the head of the Church of
England.4 6 In 1534, he refused to swear allegiance to the Act of
Succession, which contained an anti-papal preface that asserted
Parliament's authority to legislate on matters of religion and was
generally subversive of the authority of the Catholic Church in
England.4 7 More's refusal led to charges of treason, although
there was no evidence of his disloyalty to the King. More, citing
English precedent, as well as the statute, claimed that he could
not be convicted if he remained silent.4 8 He insisted that there
was no evidence to find him guilty in the absence of an
affirmative denial that King Henry VIII was head of the church.
The government charged More with four counts of treason:
malicious refusal to accept the King's supremacy over the
Church, conspiracy against the King, sedition, and subversion of
the authority of Parliament. 9 He argued well against the first
three charges, indicating that under English law silence was not
a crime, and in fact, evinces consent. 0 But More underestimated
the power of testimony, even if it was incredible; he suffered the
unfortunate consequences of what was likely perjured testimony
concerning the fourth charge of denying Parliament's power to
declare the king to be the head of the Church in England." The
paucity of evidence did not matter, as the jury took only fifteen
minutes to render a guilty verdict. 52 His execution followed soon
" See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 136-37.
4 Id. at 137; see infra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
4 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 162-63.
* See id. at 162.
* See id. at 157, 211. This will be elaborated on later in the Article, specifically
with respect to More's position on law, statutory interpretation, and legal analysis
altogether.
4 See id. at 211.
o See id.
" Solicitor General Richard Rich testified that More had denied the
Parliament's authority to declare the king to be head of the Church in England. Id.
at 212.
52 See id. at 214.
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thereafter.' More than three hundred and fifty years later, Pope
John Paul II proclaimed that More was the "Patron of Statesmen
and Politicians."54
II. SOCIAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT
A. Historical Background
Tudor leadership, the English Renaissance, the Reformation,
New World adventures, and the seeds of the English Revolution
dominated the era in which Thomas More lived and informed
every major intellectual idea of the period. Sixteenth century
England was heavily aristocratic, dominated by traditional
feudalism and monarchy, and looking to the New World for new
economic opportunities. 5 It was primarily manorial, although
London was a "busy, rich, sophisticated" city5 6 ; priests and lords
remained the primary leaders of local agrarian communities,
while nobles, merchants, and the monarch built relationships
entirely on mutual self-interest in accumulating wealth and
power.5 7  Economic arrangements began to shift away from
feudalism but titles reflecting nobility remained." Tudor society
consisted of a defined and set social order; the king and the
nobility sat at the top of the pyramid and rested on the shoulders
of peasants. Peasant agriculture was the foundation of the
economy.o In the eyes of many English citizens, social hierarchy
reflected divine and traditional preferences, and movement
between the classes was almost impossible, although those with
exceptional talent could eventually reach the top.6' Further, the
monarchical leadership was consistently decadent, profligate,
I See id. at 219.
" Pope John Paul II, Apostolic Letter Issued Motu Proprio Proclaiming Saint
Thomas More Patron of Statesmen and Politicians, VATICAN (Oct. 31, 2000),
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paulii/motu-proprio/documents/hfjp-ii
motu-proprio_20001031_thomas-moreen.html.
'5 See AMES, supra note 29, at 23.
56 WILSON, supra note 9, at 18.
6' See id. at 4, 25.
" See id. at 62-63.
59 See id. at 62.
6 See id. at 28-29.
6" See id. at 62-63.
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and excessive. King Henry VII showcased power through
theatrics; costly celebrations characterized minor political
victories and royalty was constantly on display.62
Further, the constantly shifting power struggle between
Parliament and the King dominated the English political
situation. Most English citizens considered Parliament relevant
but the institution remained subject to the whims of the
monarch:
Parliament was by now fully recognised as an essential part of
government but it was only an occasional part. The Lords and
Commons were summoned at the discretion of the monarch,
discussed business, most of which was originated by the crown,
and were dismissed as soon as that business was concluded.63
King Henry VIII especially feared aristocratic rebellion.64
More, himself a Member of Parliament, actually disappointed the
King at certain intervals to the point that he thought his life, as
well as his father's, may even be in jeopardy." Specifically, he
argued forcefully against the imposition of new taxes as an unfair
burden on the lower classes in society." His son-in-law, William
Roper, notes how More used his grammatical, rhetorical, and
legal talents to defend the middle class.
B. Intellectual Context
Not surprisingly, these conditions contributed to the rise of
humanism, which attempted to promote "new learning" with an
eye toward producing a golden age of harmony and progress.
Erasmus, who was one of More's friends, was the most visible
thinker behind this philosophical perspective. More and
Erasmus sought to imbue education with the classical notion of
virtue, especially in its moral and civic facets." Erasmus was
young, religious, academic, witty, and rhetorically gifted. He
"made the new learning fashionable" and attracted scores of
62 See id. at 92.
1 Id. at 101.
6 See AMES, supra note 29, at 32.
6 WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 51.
6 See WILSON, supra note 5, at 102.
67 See AMES, supra note 29, at 40.
6 WILSON, supra note 5, at 2; see WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note
7, at 64.
'* See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 97.
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young students." Humanism mirrored some of the thought of
the Reformation in that it sought to point out hypocrisy and
profligacy in English high society." Erasmus' most famous work,
The Praise of Folly, satirized abuses within religious authority
while simultaneously praising the piety of those same
institutions." Put simply, he pointed out the plight of the poor
and the incompetence of rulers." Erasmus and his friends
consistently opposed taxation and wars that imposed burdens on
the middle class. Yet More differed from Erasmus in one key
respect: More sought to apply theory to imperfect government,
albeit prudently."
More's lifetime also saw the rise of Martin Luther and
another anti-authority religious figure named William Tyndale.
Indeed, many of More's writings respond to the attacks levied by
each man; More considered it his personal responsibility to
defend the Catholic Church. Each side shared little in common,
that is, other than their intense religious fervor. Tyndale,
echoing Luther, preached the all-saving power of faith and that
Scripture was the final authority on religious questions; More
emphasized church membership, obedience to religious authority,
and other traditional Catholic dogmas.7 7  Anti-clericalism was
rampant; the reformers could not tolerate excessiveness and
hypocrisy in church authority.78  Most significantly, the
individual became primary in religious experience: "[Elvery
individual was free to make his peace with God without the need
70 WILSON, supra note 5, at 77.
n1 See id.
72 See generally DESIDERIUS ERASMUS, THE PRAISE OF FOLLY AND OTHER
WRITINGS (Robert M. Adams ed. & trans., 1989).
7 See AMES, supra note 29, at 106, 111.
74 See id. at 109.
7 See id. at 106 ("[Erasmus] lived too much outside of practical reality, and
thought too naively of the corrigibility of mankind, to realise the difficulties and
necessities of government." (internal quotation mark omitted)).
7 WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 118-27.
7 See WILSON, supra note 5, at 194 ("There was no common ground between the
protagonists. Tyndale argued for an invisible church of individuals saved by their
faith in Christ as revealed in Scripture. More believed that salvation was only
possible in and through membership of the historic church and obedience to its
leaders.").
78 See id. at 196, 212. One major movement in England consisted of the Lollards.
They placed absolute authority in the Bible and rejected the legitimacy of the
priesthood. Id. at 213-14.
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for a mediating priesthood." 9 Luther was the backbone of the
emergence of Protestant ideas and his positions spread quickly
throughout England." In 1517, he challenged the selling of
indulgences when he posted the Ninety-Five Theses.8 1 By 1520,
he published the implications of his doctrines and visibly
challenged papal authority.82
More and Luther engaged in a spirited debate over the
legitimacy of religious institutions and foundational issues in
both Christian theology and philosophy. More strongly opposed
Luther's skepticism regarding reason, virtue, the existence of
free will, and rational access to truth. More knew that the
Catholic Church was imperfect; he just did not see its inherent
corruption to the point that it should be destroyed. Indeed, More
recognized the Church as legally legitimate; calls for its
destruction would undermine safety, security, peace, and
international unity.84 More's prudence underscored his
philosophical debate with Luther. Luther concluded that only
scrapping everything could solve ecclesiastical and religious
institutional problems; More, while seeing imperfections that
needed to be addressed in the same institutions, desired to
preserve their core, which he felt was intrinsically good. Reform
may be necessary, but the Church deserved some respect, which
involved using "legitimate means" to bring reform. 5 He
preferred to acknowledge the legitimacy of religious tradition in
the face of revolutionary ideas because that tradition consisted of
the "consente [sic] and agrement [sic] of all crysten [sic] people
this fyften [sic] hundred yere [sic] confermed [sic. "86 More was
not one to tear down a fence before knowing all of the reasons for
why it was erected in the first place.
7 Id. at 214.
so See id. at 217-19.
81 Id. at 217.
82 Id.
"3 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 97.
* See id. at 98.
8 Id. at 123.
86 6 SAINT THOMAS MORE, A Dialogue Concerning Heresies, in THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF SAINT THOMAS MORE 1, 346 (Thomas M. C. Lawler et al. eds., 1981)
[hereinafter MORE, A Dialogue].
87 See 3 G.K. CHESTERTON, The Thing: Why I Am a Catholic, in THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF G.K. CHESTERTON 133, 157-58 (1990).
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Perhaps most troubling for More was Luther's utter refusal
to argue doctrinal differences on the "level field" of reason.88 This
difference demonstrates the beginning of modern philosophy's
presumption of the inadequacy of reason and preference for
"feelings" and the passions, especially with respect to moral
questions. 9 More consistently highlighted how Luther's
teachings presumed the infallibility of individual and subjective
interpretation, which essentially undermined the entire basis of
legitimate argument and debate and served as one of the
foundations of legal positivism.o
More also saw Luther's political writings, especially those
relating to the legitimacy of civil law, as highly dangerous.
Luther advocated an absolutist principle of consent: "[Neither
pope, nor bishop, nor any man has the right to impose a single
syllable on a Christian man, unless this is done by the latter's
consent."91 More quickly noted the unlikelihood that criminals
would consent to laws that punish their behavior, thereby
demonstrating that Luther's position was absurd for anyone
concerned with the safety and security of communities.9 2 Reason
linked to the common good, rather than will, was the foundation
of rules in society.
C. More's Philosophy of Life
More's philosophy of life underlies his writing in Utopia and
parallels the thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Hence,
understanding the key aspects of the Thomistic perspective on
epistemology, ethics and virtue, politics, and law is essential
before analyzing the primary characteristics of More's legal
career and jurisprudence as well as the ideas he communicates in
Utopia. This section will focus on More's pursuit of Christian
virtue in his personal life and how that pursuit informed his
public service.
8 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 103.
89 See infra notes 151-204 and accompanying text.
9 Because objective moral norms are impossible to know via reason, will and
preference replace deliberation as the foundation of law. See infra notes 260-318
and accompanying text.
91 5 SAINT THOMAS MORE, Responsio ad Lutherum, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
SAINT THOMAS MORE 1, 271 (John M. Headley ed., Sister Scholastica Mandeville
trans., 1969).
2 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 99.
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Aquinas' ethical thought revolves around the notion that
human beings possess an ultimate end that is simultaneously the
purpose of life. This purpose transcends safety, pleasure, or
other temporal goods." The human end is happiness
characterized by a relationship with the divine: "[Tihe ultimate
end of man is an uncreated good, namely, God."94 Activities that
promote the pursuit of God are good. "[U]ltimate perfection is in
the activity whereby he is united to God."" The pursuit is deeply
intellectual, although the senses "can belong to man's happiness
antecedently and consequently."" But "the essence of happiness
consists in an act of the intellect."" For Aquinas, "[u]ltimate and
perfect happiness can only be in the vision of the divine
essence."98
Thomas More sought happiness by pursuing spirituality
through the cultivation of virtue, which mirrors Aquinas. In fact,
he desired to cultivate virtue so much that he contemplated
leaving London because it was not a suitable environment for
doing so:
[I]n the city what is there to move one to live well? [B]ut rather,
when a man is straining in his own power to climb the steep
path of virtue, it turns him back by a thousand devices and
sucks him back by its thousand enticements. Wherever you
betake yourself, on one side nothing but feigned love . .. on the
other, fierce hatreds, quarrels, the din of the forum murmur
against you. Wherever you turn your eyes, what else will you
see but ... gluttony and the world and the world's lord, the
devil?99
But More was not a quitter, especially when it came to
developing his spiritual and moral character. From an early age,
he used his intellect to not only discover his weaknesses, but to
= See SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON HAPPINESS 21-23 (John A.
Oesterle trans., 1964).
9 Id. at 27.
9 Id. at 29.
96 Id. at 31.
9 Id. at 33. Aquinas also emphasizes that happiness consists in the activity of
the speculative rather than practical intellect. At one point, Aquinas notes that
complete happiness consists in contemplation of the divine. Id. at 35.
98 Id. at 39.
9 ST. THOMAS MORE: SELECTED LETTERS 4-5 (Elizabeth Frances Rogers ed.,
1961).
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devise ways in which to diligently train his soul."oo This mirrors
Aristotle and Aquinas in that virtue is the product of habituated
activity."o0 He also perceived honorable qualities in his teachers
and sought to mimic them.102  In fact, he befriended many
spiritual figures, who inspired many of the spiritual practices
that endured throughout his life.'03 His thought on virtues can
be found in his spiritual poetry. Followers of Christ should be
joyful, trusting and faithful, vigilant, courageous, humble, and
unwilling to yield to temporal pleasure and transient desire.10 4
For More, attentive, thorough, and unyielding commitment
cultivated love and virtue; further, the unity of human and divine
will epitomizes virtue.0 5 More understood the human purpose as
pursuit of the divine: "[A person] should abstain, not only from
unlawful pleasures, but also from lawful, to the end that he may
altogether wholly have his mind .. . heavenward ... unto the
contemplation of heavenly things."'0 6  For-More, human beings
should seek to contemplate God.'07 His faith in the power of
virtue is the basis of his theory of social existence, specifically
with respect to the role of law. Virtue allows reason to reign and
"when reason reigns ... some measure of justice and peace be
realized." 0 This disposition regarding character development
certainly informs More's perspective on the nature of law,
specifically positive law.
More's chief response to the historical conditions noted
above, especially to the English social and economic situation,
came in Utopia. He reflected on the shortcomings of sixteenth
100 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 3 ("[Clarity of
judgment led him to decide early in life to train himself with great diligence and
care.").
101 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 18-29 (Terence Irwin trans., 2d ed. 1999)
(discussing virtue as habituated virtuous activity).
102 More praised his first instructor, John Morton, in Utopia stating that "[hle
was a man ... who deserved respect as much for his prudence and virtue as for his
authority," "[h]is speech was polished and pointed," and "he had acquired a
statesman's sagacity which, when thus learned, is not easily forgotten." 4 SAINT
THOMAS MORE, Utopia: Book I, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF SAINT THOMAS MORE
46, 59-61 (Edward Surtz & J. H. Hexter eds., 1965).
103 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 15.
" See id. at 24-25.
105 See id. at 23.
106 1 SIR THOMAS MORE, The Life of John Picus, in THE ENGLISH WORKS OF SIR
THOMAS MORE 347, 378 (W. E. Campbell ed., 1931).
1o7 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 88.
'e Id. at 97.
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century England, including its geographical and moral
deficiencies. 0 Indeed, England, and especially London, had its
fair share of poverty. The cost of living increased by three
hundred percent at the beginning of the sixteenth century.10
Urban areas decayed because the lower and middle classes could
not afford to pay exorbitant rents."' More had a special place for
social reform and for crafting law to correspond to the needs of
the poor.112  Part humanist and part realist lawyer, More
recognized poverty as a principal cause of crime, if not the
primary cause."3 In Utopia, he criticizes nobility and reflects on
the significant contributions of poor and lower class workers to
society. 114
Most significantly, Utopia is an exercise in answering the
central question of political philosophy: "What is the best way of
life?""- He emphasizes the significance of individual and
communal virtue in society in Utopia. The citizens in More's
Utopia mirror the ideal citizens in ancient Greek and Roman
thought: "The Utopian moral philosophers maintain that
pleasure is the goal of life, but they find that the most
pleasurable life is that of virtue.""e Many scholars note that
More references Cicero more than fifty times in Utopia."7 Yet
More's citizens differ from the ideal citizen in ancient thought in
one key facet: they disregard the false promises of prestige and
privilege. The citizens consistently look to reason and the social
nature of human beings as the backbone of society."18  For
example, they recognize the "fellowship of nature."" 9 Virtue is
simultaneously intellectual, social, and active, which parallels
Aquinas' conception of happiness.'2 0 This has radical
109 See WILSON, supra note 5, at 19.
110 See id. at 4.
nI See id. at 31.
112 See id. at 155-56.
n1 See id. at 67-68.
114 See id. at 33; UTOPIA, supra note 2, at 82-85.
115 GERARD B. WEGEMER, THOMAS MORE ON STATESMANSHIP 113 (1996)
[hereinafter WEGEMER, MORE ON STATESMANSHIP] (internal quotation marks
omitted).
no GEORGE M. LOGAN, The Argument of Utopia, in INTERPRETING THOMAS
MORE'S UTOPIA 7, 24-25 (John C. Olin ed., 1989).
117 See WEGEMER, MORE ON STATESMANSHIP, supra note 115, at 111.
11s See LOGAN, supra note 116, at 25.
19 UTOPIA, supra note 2, at 66.
120 See LOGAN, supra note 116, at 25.
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implications for communities because it rejects the Lockean idea
of atomistic individuals; societal institutions must account for the
fact that individuals are mutually dependent and thrive in
communities.121
Like Aquinas, More views human nature realistically in
Utopia, namely as fundamentally oriented to the good, albeit
sometimes selfishly so due to the human propensity to sin. The
citizens pursue pleasure and virtue through joyful and serious
activities like More's contemporaries in England.12 2 Pleasure,
virtue, and vice all exist in Utopia. Young people are prone to
lust and bodily pleasure, pride corrupts limited human
institutions, crime and disputes between private parties occur,
and the aesthetics and usefulness of the natural city are
imperfect.12 3  This is probably why More amplifies the
significance of education in Utopia. The Utopian philosophy
regarding the cultivation of virtue through education mirrors
More's personal pursuit as well as his instruction of his children.
Raphael likely echoes More's thoughts on the importance of
education:
If you allow young folk to be abominably brought up and their
characters corrupted, little by little, from childhood; and if then
you punish them as grownups for committing crime to which
their early training has inclined them, what else is this, I ask,
but first making them thieves and then punishing them for
it?124
Specifically, Utopians develop their character from "their
upbringing, since the institutions of their society are completely
opposed to such folly, and partly from instruction and their
reading of good books."125 Although impossible to know for sure,
Utopia likely expresses More's preference for personal education,
especially regarding virtue, considering his own personal
practice. This mirrors the traditionalist philosophy of Aristotle
121 Id. at 26 ("[I1f one's own happiness is incompatible with special privilege or
with spoiling others' happiness, then it follows that the institutions of the
commonwealth, whose goal is to maximize the happiness of its citizens, must be
structured so as to implement in every possible way the Golden Rule.").
122 UTOPIA, supra note 2, at 44. They believe strongly in the dignity of work and
competition; they "keep interested in gardening, partly because they delight in it,
and also because of the competition between different streets which challenge one
another to produce the best gardens." Id. at 35.
123 See id. at 35, 41, 60-61.
124 Id. at 14.
125 Id. at 49.
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and Aquinas that recognizes the importance of quality education
for the cultivation of good citizenship. Finally, More also
comments on the impact of community on positive human
development. More's Utopians accept the social nature of
humans as they pursue activities acknowledging the "fellowship
of nature." 2 6 Human nature connects individuals, but "men who
are separated by some natural obstacle as slight as a hill or a
brook are joined by no bond of nature."'27 The Utopians'
promotion of a classless society that prioritizes equality rather
than the needs of the wealthy or the popular reflects More's
personal philosophy of impartiality in the administration of
justice.128
In short, the city designs its institutions to promote virtue,
which reflects More's understanding of the purpose of law and
societal custom.'29 More's realism about human nature tempers
his thought on the purpose of law, which will be discussed
later. 130
III. PHILOSOPHY, JURISPRUDENCE, AND THOMAS MORE
A. Knowledge and the Intelligibility of Values
More, living at the tail end of the scholastic era, parallels
Aquinas' thought on the nature of knowledge and the
intelligibility of values. More did not expressly articulate an
epistemology; however, because his thought adheres faithfully to
the teachings of natural law and their basis in human nature,
and he was a fierce defender of Catholic dogma, his epistemology
follows in the same vein. Therefore, understanding Aquinas'
philosophy of knowledge is essential to understanding the
philosophy held by More.
126 Id. at 66.
127 Id. at 65 (referring to Utopian dislike of treaties that sever natural human
bonds).
128 In Utopia, Raphael emphasizes the virtues of a legal system devoid of the
institution of private property. The abolition of private property mitigates the
development of vice. See id. at 42.
129 See LOGAN, supra note 116, at 28-29; see also infra notes 205-58 and
accompanying text.
130 See infra notes 205-59 and accompanying text.
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The key to Aquinas' understanding of the nature of
knowledge is his willingness to recognize the legitimacy of
metaphysics."' The study of essences is the foundation of the
natural law.132 The possibility of knowing being and the essences
of things is the foundation of Aquinas' natural law.' 3 Heinrich
Rommen summarizes the Thomistic philosophy of knowledge
best:
Man perceives individual things through the imagination and
the senses, and he is thus able to apply the universal knowledge
which is in the intellect to the particular thing; for, properly
speaking, it is neither the intellect nor the senses that perceive:
it is man who understands by means of both.134
Both the intellect and the senses combine to form ideas that
understand that which exists. Ideas are "that by which" things
in reality are understood. This is why "[t]he things themselves
are the cause and measure of our knowledge.... The being of
the thing is the measure of truth."35
Hence, knowledge is the product of apprehending essences
that exist prior to the intellect.'3 6  The intellect perceives
essences, in conjunction with the attributes of the senses, and
formulates ideas about those essences. But the essences remain
the truth-not the ideas. The object of knowledge is the essence
of a thing.'3 ' As Rommen states: "To know a thing ... means to
apprehend or assimilate the essence of the thing."13 8  Further,
13' See ROMMEN, supra note 6, at 141.
132 See id. ("The idea of natural law obtains general acceptance only in the
periods when metaphysics, queen of the sciences, is dominant. It recedes or suffers
an eclipse, on the other hand, when being ... and oughtness, morality and law, are
separated, when the essences of things and their ontological order are viewed as
unknowable.").
13 See id. at 143.
134 Id.
'1 Id. at 144.
13 See id. ("Reality exists prior to the intellect."). Interestingly, this is the
reverse of Descartes' famous axiom: "I... think[], therefore I [am]." See RENA
DESCARTES, DESCARTES: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 162 (John
Cottingham et al. trans., 1988).
131 See ROMMEN, supra note 6, at 145.
138 Id. at 148. Aquinas articulates a principle of "adequatio" when discussing
how intellectual concepts formed by the mind interact with reality. Concepts are
adequate, proportionally, to the thing in reality. The mind is adequate to the task of
grasping reality, but the truth of a given concept remains wedded to the thing itself,
which is the measure. See Professor G. Robert Blakey, University of Notre Dame
The Law School, Lecture Notes on Thomas Aquinas (Feb. 2010) [hereinafter Blakey,
Lecture Notes on Thomas Aquinas] (on file with author).
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essence indicates the nature of a thing.13 9 Essence corresponds to
form, which represents simultaneously the efficient cause and
end of the particular thing.140
Aquinas makes the Aristotelian observation that things aim
for their own good and perfection. Thus, goodness corresponds to
a particular thing's aim or end.141 Everything naturally pursues
its essence. 1 42 Truth, goodness, and beauty are facts of being. In
the natural law framework, teleology is the link between being
and oughtness; the "ought" is intrinsically part of the "is" rather
than a matter of logical deduction. 4 3 And because the intellect
can perceive a thing's end, or telos, it can also determine ethical
principles according to what is in accordance with a thing's end.
As Rommen summarizes: "Knowable being is the principle of
oughtness. The supreme principle of oughtness is simply this:
Become your essential being."'" Unsurprisingly, humans are
things, possess an end, and the purpose of life is to live according
to that purpose.145 Thus, Aquinas and likely More believe there
is a connection between existence and ethics.
Illustrative of More's theory of knowledge is his defense of
the authority of the Catholic Church against Martin Luther with
respect to the idea of grace. More, following Catholic dogma,
recognized the positive role of reason in ethical development and
faithful living.146  On the contrary, Luther placed his theory of
grace entirely in terms of faith. This is why Luther's call for
reform consistently attacked the "faith" of those in charge.14 7
139 See ROMMEN, supra note 6, at 146.
140 See id. at 148.
141 See id.
142 See id. at 150.
143 See id. ("The teleological conception, grounded in the metaphysics of being, is
therefore the basis of the essential unity of being and oughtness, of being and
goodness.... A basis of right exists only when in something factual an essential
being is striving for realization."). For Aquinas, truth, goodness, and beauty are facts
of being rather than conclusions from being. This is why Aquinas does not fall victim
to Hume's is/ought distinction, namely because the "is" already contains the "ought."
"Ought" is intrinsically related to being itself rather than a logical deduction, which
is Hume's main criticism. Unfortunately for Hume, he misunderstood traditional
natural law theory.
" Id. at 156.
14 See id. ("For the rational, free nature of man this signifies: Act in accordance
with reason; bring your essential being to completion; fulfill the order of being which
you confront as a free creature.").
146 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 97.
17 See id. at 98.
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Indeed, Luther's recommendation-basically total uprooting of
the Church-matches his skepticism of the power of reason. For
Luther, only those that received grace through faith were fit to
hold authority.148 On the contrary, More's faith in the authority
of the Church, and thereby his call for careful rather than radical
reform, presupposes faith in the ability of reason to reach
principled and just solutions.'4 9
B. Comparison to Other Jurisprudential Perspectives
This section compares More's philosophy, which is truly an
expression of the thought of Thomas Aquinas, with the
jurisprudential perspectives of other major philosophers ranging
from Ancient Greece to the modern world. More's philosophy
contrasts sharply with most philosophers of the Ancient world,
especially regarding their skepticism. His code of ethics is
universal and governed according to principles of reason,
whereas Ancient thinkers such as Protagoras, Gorgias, Pyrhho,
and Timeon doubted both existence and its intelligibility.'50
These thinkers laid the seeds of modern skepticism and
positivism, which also counteract More's philosophy of law. The
modern heirs to these Ancient thinkers include Locke, Descartes,
Hume, and Bentham, among others.
Descartes' epistemology reflected a shift in understanding
human nature and thereby influenced his entire philosophy. 15 1
This is the basis of his major challenge to traditional natural law
theory. It also laid the foundation for the newer individualist
natural rights theory that arises during the Enlightenment.
Descartes rejects Aquinas' conception of understanding as a
product of the intellect and senses as well as the idea that human
reason is only part of the natural order.15 2  Descartes rests
human nature wholly on the capacity to think. "[Mian is a res
cogitans."sa The capacity to reason is absolute and does not exist
as only part of the natural order. The intellect is wholly
sufficient. The absolutism of reason is the basis of reality.
"[M]an, from his innate ideas, from the ideas present in his
"" See id.
"* See infra Part III.C.
s0 See Blakey, Lecture Notes on Thomas Aquinas, supra note 138.
15 See ROMMEN, supra note 6, at 86.
152 See id. at 77.
16 Id.
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consciousness, can construct the world along the lines of
mathematical reasoning, the ideal of science. All that man needs
to do is constructively to [sic] develop what is in human reason,
that is, the innate ideas."15 4 This unequivocal rationalism
undermines the entire foundation of traditional natural law
because it does not acknowledge the existence of an objective
order. Rationalism allows the mind to assign definitions to
things. "Rationalism soon made human reason and its innate
ideas the measure of what is.""55 Hence, rationalism eradicates
the science of being, namely metaphysics, which is the
foundation of the natural law, while simultaneously laying the
groundwork for rationalist positivism.
Descartes' rationalism has many implications. First, he laid
the groundwork for the individualism characteristic of the
Enlightenment. By establishing the intellect as absolute and
wholly self-sufficient, Descartes effectively erased the natural
sociability of humans. "[The intellect] does not need the
educative cooperation of other minds. Thus the very spiritual
root of sociability is denied.""5 ' This idea undeniably contributes
to the social contract theorists that found their political
philosophy on the state of nature composed wholly of individuals.
Rommen believes Descartes' rationalism finds its fullest
expression in the individualism of Kant."' Second, rationalism is
the foundation of subjectivism; when reason is absolute and the
definer of reality, maintaining objective norms of value is
impossible, aside from those reached by consent or majority
opinion. Yves Simon touches on this when he discusses modern
value prescriptions:
At any rate, when we hear today of moral values, esthetic
values, social values, political values, spiritual values, etc., we
should know where these come from. They come from the mind,
they come from outside the things, they are not embodied in
entities, in nature. Thus, 'this has value' does not mean that by
14 Id.
165 Id. at 78.
156 Id. at 77.
1,1 Id. at 78. ("This process reached its climax in Kant. Human reason now
becomes the sovereign architect of the order of knowledge; it becomes the measure of
things. The objective basis of natural law, the ordo rerum and the eternal law, has
vanished. What was termed natural law is a series of conclusions drawn from the
categorical imperative and from the regulative ideas of practical reason, not from the
objective and constitutive ordo rerum.").
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reason of what the thing is it is adjusted to something else, to
some operation or to some relation: [I]ts value is something
assigned to it by the mind while, in itself, it remains without
value, without nature.'58
Rationalism makes reality wholly subjective and the value of
a thing only comes from it being assigned by an outside party.
"Intrinsic value" is an oxymoron in a Cartesian universe. Simon
extends this to note that teleology cannot exist in a Cartesian
universe. This is because in a mechanistic world value is wholly
extrinsic.'"' Therefore, a Cartesian universe has no place for
traditional natural law theory that emphasizes the reality of
being and the limits of human reason in the natural order.
Locke contributed to modern skepticism when he doubted
the legitimacy of innate ideas and articulated how experience
was the sole foundation of knowledge.'6 0 Locke's philosophy
resulted in nominalism, namely the denial of accessible universal
ideas or principles, which contrasts sharply with Thomistic
theories of knowledge. Notably, Locke's philosophy also gave
birth to atomism, thereby resulting in fervent individualism and
the prioritization of individual rights. This contrasts with More's
pursuit of virtue, which involves fervent recognition of others and
the significance of communities for flourishing. For Locke,
society is an aggregate of individuals rather than a natural social
entity.1 6' This has radical implications for the purpose of
government and law, namely prioritization of pre-political and
social rights. For Locke, the law should primarily seek to protect
natural rights rather than pursue justice and a conception of the
common good.162 Rights are antecedent to the common good and
the law should take cognizance of this fact. This philosophy of
natural rights pervades the American founding and is a major
challenge to applying More's jurisprudence in the American
framework. 6 3
More's philosophy also contrasts starkly with the
epistemology of David Hume, which like Locke's epistemology,
cannot come to grips with the legitimacy of metaphysics and the
l"YVES R. SIMON, THE TRADITION OF NATURAL LAw: A PHILOSOPHER'S
REFLECTIONS 51 (1992).
16. Id. at 48.
16o See ROMMEN, supra note 6, at 80.
' See Blakey, Lecture Notes on Thomas Aquinas, supra note 138.
162 Id.
1e See infra totes 353-63 and accompanying text.
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natural capacity of human reason. Hume grounds his philosophy
of knowledge in empiricism. He confines knowledge to direct
observation via sense impression; ideas are the product of
sensory experience and observation.'" Ideas are "that which"
understand reality rather than "that by which" reality is
understood. Reason is subservient to passion in human
nature. 16 5  Hume's chief contribution, or lack thereof, to
epistemology, is that he "leaves no method for determining what
is intrinsically good or bad in these passions and in the acts that
proceed from them."166 Moral principles do not come from
objective truth or reason and their status, as "principles," is
dubious for Hume.16 7 Thus, Hume severs the link between being
and ought found in Aquinas and the natural law tradition:
"Hume rejects the fundamental conception of St. Thomas that
being, truth, and goodness are intrinsically linked together."6
Because the human intellect cannot grasp essences, or the "is," it
also cannot determine the "ought" as a matter of logical
deduction.16 9 As mentioned earlier, Hume's understanding of the
1" DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 414 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.,
1888).
16 Id. at 415.
168 ROMMEN, supra note 6, at 99.
1 See id.
16 Id. at 100. Hilary Putnam attacked Hume's critique of the "is/ought" problem
by demonstrating that factual assertions are not devoid of values. See generally
HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND OTHER
ESSAYS 28-46 (2002) (discussing the entanglement of fact and value). Interpreting
factual statements, even the most raw facts, still involves inherent values and
normative assumptions. Therefore, the is/ought distinction is not a logical problem
as Hume asserts. "Ought," or values, are simply unavoidable and intrinsically part
of "is." This seems right on its face. After all, at what moment in human existence
have human beings lived in a world with only facts? Individuals, simply by being
born, are put into situations involving values and preferences. Putnam also
attempted to show that ideas and meanings are not just "in the head." Putnam used
his famous "twin worlds" thought experiment to prove how meaning exists outside
the mind. See generally Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of 'Meaning', in 2
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: MIND, LANGUAGE, AND REALITY 215 (Hilary Putnam ed.,
1975). Finally, Putnam, in his philosophy of science, sought to demonstrate how
scientific skepticism maintains its own assumptions and values. For example, if
science were truly devoid of non-demonstrable facts, it would not contain theoretical
terminology describing demonstrable data. Science contains values, such as
consistency, as well. See PUTNAM, supra, at 20-27 (acknowledging how science
maintains its own set of values).
169 See ROMMEN, supra note 6, at 100. ("For Hume, being does not appear to the
human intellect as the true because man's mind has no access to the thing-in-itself,
to the essences or ideas of things.").
167
JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 51:145
relationship between "is" and "ought" as a logical deduction
misconstrues traditional natural law theory by failing to see how
"ought" is part of "is" from the beginning.
Indeed, for Hume, morality is a product of sentiment.7 0 But
the foundation of approval or disapproval of a particular practice
is the principle of utility, later developed further by utilitarian
thinkers like Bentham and Mill. Approval conveys usefulness.171
Usefulness corresponds to desires concerning self-preservation or
individual and societal self-interest, normally in the form of some
degree of pleasure.172 Hence, Hume really is, as Rommen calls
him, an empiricist positivist. 73 Goodness and justice, if they
even exist, are contingent on usefulness, born from subjective
sensory experience and expressed through sentiment.174  The
empiricist work of Hume reflects the assumptions underlying
legal positivism, which prioritizes the will, or approval, of the
majority, as the highest value supporting the legitimacy of law.
This is because it discounts the legitimacy of metaphysics as a
limiting and guiding principle.17s Legal positivism is a reflection
of Hume's attempted deconstruction of the relationship between
being and oughtness and its effect on human law. The tenets
and merits of positivism are discussed below.176
Related is the philosophy of Bentham and Mill, who are often
known as the founders of utilitarianism. Bentham followed
Hume for the most part, but his valuing of utility indicates he is
not a total skeptic.177  Like Locke, Bentham is a nominalist:
Words refer to "fictional entities." 7 s Goodness, and thereby
individual happiness, depends on utility. Utility is the product of
the weighing of pleasure and pain, which can occur either from a
universal or individual perspective, although this ambiguity is
17 See DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 107
(Charles W. Hendel ed., 1957) ("V]irtue [is] whatever mental action or quality gives
to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary.").
17 See ROMMEN, supra note 6, at 99.
172 See id.
173 See id. at 100.
17 See id. ("The good and the just are what is here and now deemed useful to
the self-interest of individuals and to their life in common.").
"1 See id. at 109.
17 See infra notes 340-51 and accompanying text.
17 See Professor G. Robert Blakey, University of Notre Dame The Law School,
Lecture Notes on Positivism (Mar. 2010) [hereinafter Blakey, Lecture Notes on
Positivism] (on file with author).
178 Id.
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one of the major criticisms of utilitarianism.' 9  Indeed,
Bentham's utility principle ultimately results in subjectivism or,
as some professors like to call it, "psychological hedonism."180
The utility principle, which informs ethical decisions,
presupposes that "identity" is static and that results are
foreseeable.'"' It also equalizes all pleasures; it does not allow for
a distinction between types of pleasures because that would
presuppose a standard by which to judge pleasure, thereby
indicating that pleasure is not the real focus of the inquiry.182
Finally, the utility principle pursues the blind maximization of
such pleasure at all costs. The question of distributive justice is
beside the point for Bentham and he does not account for
interpersonal utility. In other words, Bentham's utility principle,
while seemingly in touch with the desires of human beings,
actually leads to the prioritization of pleasure over justice.183
Richard Posner attempts to resolve the difficulties of
measurement and calculation that plague utilitarianism by
associating utility with the allocation of resources according to
rational choice principles.'" For Posner, the optimal result
occurs when everyone has chosen and receives what they want.
Choice pursuing economic efficiency is the organizing principle
and the law should promote the exercise of individual autonomy
with respect to economic decisions. Utility is a function of the
"efficient choice" in any given situation. 85  However, this
seemingly remains susceptible to the same problems confronting
utility measured by pleasure; Posner's theory equates goodness
with choice despite the fact that goodness seems to be a more
complex concept. If choice is the measure of good, then the
availability of choice implies the non-existence of evil.88 Further,
Posner's theory assumes that individuals choose wisely simply by
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virtue of having the ability to choose. It does not take a rocket
scientist to realize that human beings do not always make the
most efficient decisions in a given situation.18 7
Lon Fuller and John Finnis, two modern philosophers,
sought to revive natural law as it relates to discussions of
jurisprudence. Fuller, like Aquinas and More, recognized reason
as essential to natural law."88 Yet his morality, as it relates to
law, is an internal one.8 9 Legitimate human law maintains
certain inherent purposes and principles that bind together the
more visible rules: "What Fuller is setting out are principles of
legality, a restatement of the rule of law." 90 In this sense, Fuller
prioritizes the concept of order in a legal system. Order,
expressed in procedural rules, underlies the force of law.191
In contrast, Finnis reformulates natural law according to a
theory of "basic goods."192 These goods are self-evident and serve
as the basis of the natural law rather than Aquinas' teleological
understanding of the nature of things. The natural law is a
product of practical reasonableness "in ordering human life and
human community."193 The basic goods are "pre-moral" and
objectively and self-evidently good.'9" They include: life,
knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability or friendship,
practical reasonableness, and religion. 98 This has implications
for law, which will be discussed later in reflections on More's
jurisprudence.196
More's philosophy also contrasts with realism, which
counteracted rigid, abstract formalism.197 Realism, while still
positivist, located the study of law in philosophy and the social
18 For example, individuals often choose to prefer pursuing things, activities, or
relationships that run directly counter to economic efficiency. Preferring family
associations to the demands of one's career, although less financially rewarding, is
one example.
1s- See M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 119 (8th
ed. 2008) (1959).
189 See id. at 121.
190 Id.
19 See id. at 119.
192 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 281-90 (2d ed. 2011)
(1980).
193 Id. at 280.
194 See FREEMAN, supra note 188, at 127.
195 See id. at 127-28.
1 See infra Part IV.
197 See FREEMAN, supra note 188, at 985.
170
2012] JURISPRUDENCE OF SAINT THOMAS MORE
sciences, with specific emphasis on empirical studies.198
Knowledge was wholly an empirical endeavor and pragmatism is
the proper goal of the law. Oliver Wendell Holmes "stressed the
empirical and pragmatic aspect of law."'99 The study of law
primarily concerns what the law "is" rather than what it "ought"
to be. Interestingly, Holmes simultaneously referenced an
amorphous notion of "policy" that continuously informed legal
development. This is seemingly paradoxical considering Holmes'
attempt to base law on articulated principles developed solely by
empirical and historical study of human behavior.2 0 0 The realist
movement produced offspring in the form of feminist 201 and
critical race202 jurisprudence and critical legal studies.2 03 Each of
'" See id. at 988 ("Realists were the first lawyers to undertake empirical social
scientific research into laws and legal institutions, though many of their
assumptions were naive and what they produced is generally thought to suffer from
a reliance on crude empiricism.").
19 Id. at 986. Roscoe Pound articulated similar ideas. For Pound, wants and
interests drive the purposes of law; preference for expediency is the foundation of
legal pragmatism. See Professor G. Robert Blakey, University of Notre Dame The
Law School, Lecture Notes on Realism (Apr. 2010) (on file with author).
200 See FREEMAN, supra note 188, at 986. Realists do not completely deny the
"normative character of legal rules." Id. at 996. They just do not think they
completely explain why legal institutions act in certain ways. Yet realists do not
offer a better explanation when they reference "policy" as a guiding principle in legal
interpretation and decision-making.
201 Feminist jurisprudence, while splintered itself, emphasizes how the legal
order is essentially patriarchal. See id. at 1287. Feminist theory approaches the law
from a hermeneutical and emancipation perspective: it seeks to understand and then
free the legal order from the grip of patriarchy. Id. at 1297. Hence, it analyzes law
and demonstrates how the legal order perpetuates patriarchy in everyday human
affairs. Id. Its end goal is to eliminate the elements of patriarchy that supposedly
pervade the system. Id. Concepts such as the "equality principle" are not even safe;
jurisprudential feminists perceive societal notions of equality as reflecting the
dominant male psyche. Id. at 1289-91. They are skeptical of the project of grasping
essences and an objective order on which to base law; essences are nothing but social
constructs and therefore an illegitimate basis of law. Id. at 1298.
202 Critical race theory is an "off-shoot of Critical Legal Studies." Id. at 1491.
Race and its relationship to the law is the central focus. Richard Delgado is one of
the leading thinkers and speaks of how the law is wholly the product of "elite white
'imperial scholars.'" Id. Race theory advocates race consciousness and formal and
substantive equality, including an emphasis on equality in outcomes. Id. at 1492.
One pervasive difficulty confronting this perspective is its inability to clearly define
"race." Id. at 1495-96. This is potentially a serious shortcoming because how can
race theory adequately analyze the relationship between race and the law when it
cannot even define the term that is the focus of its study? And even if race could be
defined, that definition would seem to remain subject to the critique that was the
foundation of the definition in the first place. One might suggest that these
difficulties present sufficient reason to not make "race" the primary unit of analysis.
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these perspectives approach studying law from a particular slant
rather than as a holistic enterprise that is a complete reflection
of human nature.2 04
C. More and Law
Aquinas and More share essentially the same philosophy of
law. The theory of natural law that Aquinas expounds appears
in More's judicial and legal career, as well as his response to
King Henry VIII's assertion of additional authority in the
English system. Thus, understanding Aquinas' conception of
law-including all four types of law-is necessary in order to
fully appreciate how More applied it to his everyday life.
203 Critical Legal Studies (CLS) is skeptical of orthodox understandings of law
and is the parent of feminist and race jurisprudence. Id. at 1209. Similar to realism,
CLS responded to formalism. But unlike realism, CLS understands law as totally
the product of politics; the law does not maintain its own set of rules and rationales.
Id. at 1210. Hence, law is primarily the offspring of relationships of power reflected
in the political realities of society: "Legal decisions .. . are no more neutral than the
decisions of a legislature or an executive." Id. at 1216. This conception is broader in
scope than that proposed by the feminists and race scholars but echoes essentially
the same idea: the law is an expression of societal preferences, which may or may
not be desirable and somewhat arbitrary.
20 This is why these approaches to jurisprudence are completely at odds with
More's conception of jurisprudence. More understood law as a reflection of human
nature, understood in its entirety. On the contrary, these modes of analysis select
one attribute and seek to understand the entire system through the lens of that
particular trait. While the perspectives offer valuable insight at times, mostly due to
their ability to expose certain assumptions, they are not adequate to the task of
comprehensively understanding law. They mistakenly focus on one particular
attribute of human affairs rather than understanding that attribute as one aspect of
a whole that needs to be studied. In most instances, the decision to use the
particular unit of analysis appears arbitrary. This is also the problem with
postmodern jurisprudence. By deconstructing everything it disallows the
construction of anything. Postmodern scholars admit from the start that their
framework is "notoriously ambiguous." Id. at 1409 (internal quotation marks
omitted). For the postmodern, law is indeterminate. It is incapable of reaching
human affairs because it is unclear whether human affairs can even be understood
properly: "One important postmodernist theme invokes the instability or in-
determinateness of the 'subject.' " Id. at 1410. Any unit of analysis is ambiguous and
therefore incapable of informing proper legal norms. The legal system is a social
construct reflecting socially constructed units of analysis. Hence, the primary
purpose of postmodernism is to expose and "illuminate] the... master narratives"
underlying the existing system. Id. at 1414 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
aim of postmodern jurisprudence is primarily hermeneutical. Id. Legal solutions are
pluralistic in nature and seek to account for the specificity and significance of
certain human attributes neither historically perceived nor presently emphasized by
the law. Id. at 1417. Intelligibility, the locus of More's jurisprudence is non-existent
in the postmodern framework.
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For Aquinas, "law is a rule and measure of acts that induces
persons to act or refrain from acting.""' Reason, just as it is the
guide of human nature, is the foundation of law. 206 Further, law
fundamentally corresponds to and pursues the common good. 0 7
Law is also the product of legitimate authority, which can either
consist of the "whole people" or the person placed in authority. 20 8
Hence, the following definition of law: an ordinance promulgated
by a legitimate authority for the common good. Most
significantly, Aquinas articulates four types of law: eternal,
divine, natural, and human or positive law. Eternal law is
synonymous with the divine reason.2 09 Divine law is the law of
Christ articulated in Scripture; it is law expressly given by
God.2 10 The natural law is the offspring of divine reason, which
assigns proper actions based on the natural ends of things.2 1 1
Human laws correspond to the practical reason of human
beings.212
Aquinas' theories of divine and natural law and their
relationship to human law are the most relevant for studying the
jurisprudence of More. The natural law is static and immutable;
this is because all humans are "incline [d] . . . to act in accord with
reason."213 Aquinas writes: "[T]here is a single standard of truth
and right for everyone which is known by everyone."21 4  The
natural law, because it reflects human ends, promotes good.
Similarly, human laws should follow the natural law to promote
adherence to the natural law and therefore goodness. 2 15 After all,
205 THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW 1 (Richard J. Regan trans., 2000)
[hereinafter AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW].
206 See id. (footnote omitted) ("For it belongs to reason to order us to our end,
which is the primary source regarding our prospective action, as the Philosopher
says. And the source in any kind of thing is the measure and rule of that kind of
thing.").
207 See id. at 4-5.
208 See id.
209 See id. at 7. ("[Tlhe plan of governance of the world existing in God as the
ruler of the universe has the nature of law. And since God's reason conceives
eternally. . . we need to say that such law is eternal.").
210 See id. at 11.
211 See id. at 9.
212 See id. at 10.
213 Id. at 39.
214 SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, ON POLITICS AND ETHICS 50 (Paul E. Sigmund ed.
& trans., 1988) [hereinafter AQUINAS, ON POLITICS].
215 See AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW, supra note 205, at 45 ("[I]t was necessary to
establish laws in order that human beings live in peace and have virtue.").
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justice is the result of rules that follow the dictates of reason, and
the first rule of reason is the law of nature.2 16 While rulers can
dispense and modify human law, they cannot dispense with the
"precepts of the natural law."2 17 This also holds for the divine
law.218
Aquinas also has specific thoughts as to the scope of human
law. Human law must account for the practices of the
community to be legitimate and effective. Because humans are
not perfectly virtuous, the law cannot prohibit every vice. 2 19 It
should prohibit those activities that undermine the safety of
others.2 2 o Thus, law is not determinate. 221 Human law contains
gaps that must be filled by higher principles, such as the other
types of law, which are based simultaneously on theology and an
understanding of teleology. This is partially due to the
limitations of language. Law gives practicality to moral
responsibility, but it cannot do it totally given the limitations of
language. As Finnis writes:
By the language of legislation and precedent-forming judicial
arguments, we make the countless determinationes morally
required to give effect to our moral responsibility to love
(respect and promote the well-being of) our neighbour as
ourselves. But those acts of specification never altogether
eliminate vagueness, or the need for further determinations
which must seek an appropriate fit not only with the
216 See id. at 47.
217 AQUINAS, ON POLITICS, supra note 214, at 58.
218 See AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW, supra note 205, at 69 ("[O]nly God or his
special representatives can dispense from precepts of the divine law.").
219 See id. at 54-55.
220 See id. at 54 ("[HI uman law does not prohibit every kind of vice ... [but] only
the more serious kinds of vice, from which most persons can abstain, and especially
those vices that inflict harm on others, without the prohibition of which human
society could not be preserved . .. [such as homicide,] thefts, and the like.").
221 Aquinas develops the concept of "determinatio" to answer the fundamental
question of "what is law?" For Aquinas, law is under-determinate. It does not
reach-and cannot reach for that matter-every level and aspect of human action.
The general principles of the natural law must inform everyday human action when
the positive law is inadequate to the task. This contrasts with positivism, which
views law as determinate and capable of reaching human problems through logic
and formulaic rules premised on majoritarian will. It starkly contrasts with post-
modernism, which perceives law as indeterminate, namely incapable of reaching
human action. Post-modernism critiques how most legal systems improperly locate
the unit of analysis in individuals and other social constructs. See Blakey, Lecture
Notes on Thomas Aquinas, supra note 138.
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determinatio being interpreted, but also with the relevant
remainder of our law, and the continuing or perhaps new
requirements and implications of relevant moral truths.222
The intrinsic vagueness of language is inescapable and
pervades human law.2 23 Finnis' words echo More's approach to
law, which recognizes its positive and negative existence as a
force that shapes human action. This approach is prescriptive
yet humble in its scope: "[T]he classic[al] theory of determinatio
acknowledges plainly that in a good many cases there is no one
right answer, but rather a number of right (not-wrong)
answers."224  This differs significantly from legal positivism,
which views law as determinate, fills gaps with logic, and seeks
to extend to countless human actions regardless of their degree of
separation from the original precept.22 5
Further, human law has binding force on the human
conscience if it is just.226 Human laws can be unjust in two ways:
They can disregard proper human ends and compel humans to
act in ways contrary to the good or they can be the product of an
improper usage of authority.227 The latter category is perhaps
most relevant for studying More, as Aquinas notes that
Christians should obey authority that comes from God, which
precludes obedience to rulers that act outside the scope of their
authority and conflict with divine precepts: "[[R]ulers abuse
their authority] because they command things outside their
sphere of authority. In this case the subject is obliged neither to
obey or disobey."228  And laws that do not pursue the
222 JOHN FINNIS, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 38 (Jules Coleman &
Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
223 See id. at 39 ("Semantic vagueness is one, but only one, of the causes of this
pervasive under-determinacy of law.").
224 Id. at 38-39.
225 See infra notes 274-83 and accompanying text (discussing legal positivism
and "gap filling").
226 AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW, supra note 205, at 57.
227 Id. ("Laws may be unjust regarding their end, as when authorities impose
burdensome laws on citizens to satisfy the authorities' covetousness or vainglory
rather than to benefit the community. Or laws may be unjust regarding the
authority to make them, as when persons enact laws that exceed the power
committed to them.").
228 AQUINAS, ON POLITICS, supra note 214, at 65-66 n.8 (alteration in original);
see also AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW, supra note 205, at 57 ("Laws can be
unjust ... by being contrary to the divine good ... . And it is never permissible to
obey such laws, since 'we ought to obey God rather than human beings,' as Acts 5:29
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commonweal have "no power to bind morally."2 " As discussed
later, this informs More's response to King Henry VIII's decision
to separate from the Catholic Church.2 30
Similar to Aquinas, More viewed the law through the prism
of human nature: "[H]e well understood that law, like most other
professions, requires for its proper execution the philosopher's
understanding of human nature."231' He thought that natural law
existed in the human heart and could be known by reason.2 3 2
This mirrors Aquinas' notion of the natural law as immutable
and accessible by human reason. Significantly, appeals to reason
dominate More's legal career. Reason, rather than passion and
self-interest, was the key to good social order.233 Law, as the
product of generational experience and deliberation, deserved to
govern because of this inherent stability.2 34 Indeed, More's chief
criticism of Luther and his followers was their appeal to the
passions, or "fonde affeccyon. "235 More 's response to Thomas
Cromwell's demand that he take an oath indicates his belief that
the force of law corresponded to reason rather than will. More
could not be convinced to take the oath regardless of the force of
Henry's will or the consequences. As Wegemer writes, "[u]nder
the law he was protected; but only for as long as law, not
passionate will, reigned supreme."23
More also recognized the practical necessity of human
positive law; the law is simultaneously a positive and negative
response to the human condition. Law is a "sure and substantial
shield" that is necessary for human freedom and for pursuing a
just society. 7 It reminds humans of their limits and allows
them to live according to God's plan.238 Law can promote order
says."); see infra notes 244-46 and accompanying text (discussing More's
disobedience of unjust laws).
229 AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW, supra note 205, at 61.
230 See infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
231 WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 48.
232 A THOMAS MORE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 253 n.1.
233 WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 38. Interestingly,
Wegemer believes that More thought literature, rather than law, was the "primary
civilizing force" amongst the products of reason. He emphasizes More's love of
comedy and wit, expressed through literature, as evidence of this point. Id. at 38-40.
234 See WEGEMER, MORE ON STATESMANSHIP, supra note 115, at 212.
23 MORE, A Dialogue, supra note 86, at 433.
236 WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 169.
23 A THOMAS MORE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 253 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
231 See id. at 254.
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consistent with liberty and provide boundaries for individuals.
In this sense, law corresponds to the demands of human nature,
both the good and the bad, reflected in reality: "More took
guidance, as always, from his understanding of the person as free
though fallen."239 More knew that no amount of reason, without
the force of law, could check strong passion and prejudice. 24 0 At
times the law must step in and ensure safety, although that is
not its primary responsibility.2 4 ' More also perceives human law
as the product of legitimate authority, which comes from the
those who are ruled: "Any one man who has command of many
men owes his authority to those whom he commands; he ought to
have command not one instant longer than his [people] wish."2 42
And human law reflects human tradition and arises from
leadership concerned for the common good.24
Yet, like Aquinas, More knew that human law was by no
means comprehensive: It must acknowledge the primacy of
eternal, divine, and natural law.24 More expressed this idea
when he was defending himself while on trial for treason.
Questioning the legitimacy of the authority that enacted the law
that was the source of the criminal charges, as well as the judges
applying it to his case, More stated the following:
This realm, being but one member and small part of the
Church, might not make a particular law [that was]
disagreeable with the general law of Christ's Universal Catholic
Church any more than the city of London, being but one poor
member in respect of the whole realm, might make a law
against an Act of Parliament to bind the whole realm. 24 5
This passage expresses two points: First, authority cannot
produce laws that fall outside the scope of that authority.
Second, no human authority can contravene divine authority,
which in this case, was the Catholic Church installed by Christ.
More buttressed this latter point by offering scriptural texts
during his trial to prove that no layman, including King Henry
239 WEGEMER, MORE ON STATESMANSHIP, supra note 115, at 207.
240 See id. at 155.
241 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 125-26.
242 A THOMAS MORE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 237 (alteration in original)
(footnote omitted).
243 See id. at 253; see also AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW, supra note 205, at 2-3.
244 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 215-16.
245 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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VIII, could be head of the Church.2 4 6 Put simply, More could not
support the notion that human law could contradict divine law.
Human law has its limits.
More's service as Lord Chancellor provides further evidence
of his view that both law and government must be forces for the
common good that act in accordance with the natural law. His
first principle of service to the King was to tell him what he
ought to do rather than what he can do. 247  This implicitly
expresses adherence to an unspoken code of ethics rather than
blind service to raw authority and power. He explicitly mentions
how kings should rule virtuously.2 48 For More, law is the primary
indicator of a particular government's justice because it is the
product of citizens attempting to pursue the common good.24 9
Similarly, More communicates the purpose of law in Utopia.
The city of Utopia promotes virtue through law and social
custom. For example, the city places the meek in battle in order
that they may pursue courage and bravery.25 0 The abolition of
private property undermines vicious human desires, such as
greed, avarice, and pride.2 5 ' The city is cognizant of the needs of
all, thereby implicitly acknowledging how the social nature of
humans implicates the common good. One radical public policy
involves the redistribution of wealth from one city to another,
which is done freely as "outright gifts; those who give receive
nothing in return from those to whom they give. [T]hus the
whole island is like a single family."25 2 Regardless of one's
position on the soundness of this particular public policy, or
whether More actually prefers it, it is undeniable that the
passage communicates how law must acknowledge the common
good and respond to individual and social human nature.
246 See id. at 216.
247 See A THOMAS MORE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 232.
21 See id. at 237.
249 See WEGEMER, MORE ON STATESMANSHIP, supra note 115, at 209.
250 See MORE, supra note 2, at 69-70 ("[Sihame at failing their countrymen,
desperation at the immediate presence of the enemy, and the impossibility of flight
often combine to overcome their fear, and they turn brave out of sheer necessity.").
251 See id. at 42 ("[Private property] makes every living creature greedy and
avaricious-and, in addition, man develops these qualities out of pride, pride which
glories in putting down others by a superfluous display of possessions.").
252 Id. at 45.
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Finally, More's recognition of the primacy of conscience fits
neatly with his philosophy of law. Conscience was integral to
More's conception of the good and virtuous life.2" He lived by the
principle that allegiance to conscience could take precedence over
positive law because of its relationship to natural law.2 54  He
refuses the advice of his daughter, Meg, to conform his conscience
to human law that he perceives as unjust.2 5 5  For More,
conscience, informed by the natural law, is the judge of positive
law.2 56 Yet More's death also demonstrates his lifelong advocacy
of respect for human law, even unjust ones. 57 He saw the reform
of unjust laws as commendable, although he did not advocate
radical change that uprooted systems as a whole.25 8
More's understanding of the types of law, and their purpose
in society, contrasts with modern thinkers sympathetic to legal
positivism. At the most basic level, More views human law as
only one type of four and subservient to eternal, divine, and
natural law. On the contrary, legal positivists only subordinate
law to the will, or something like Thomas Hobbes' sovereign.
Either way, positivism is a sort of blind adherence to a guiding
principle, albeit one chosen by the participants in the system.
William Occam was a major medieval thinker that
challenged the notion that reason is the primary basis of law and
predates modern philosophers with related ideas. Instead, he
places the will as the dominant element in the foundation of
natural law. 25 9 For Occam, the will is higher than reason. "The
will is the nobler faculty; the intellect is but the ministering
torch-bearer of the will, which is the master."26 0 Reason simply
serves the object of the will. This is reminiscent of Thomas
Hobbes' assertion that reason simply finds the means to serve
the will's pursuit. 26 ' Thus, for Occam, the moral order finds its
basis in God's will rather than His wisdom. "As all being is
253 See WEGEMER, MORE ON STATESMANSHIP, supra note 115, at 183 ("So
important was conscience in More's understanding that he considered all education
to be ordered to its formation . . .
254 See id.
255 Id. at 210-11.
256 See id. at 211.
257 See id. at 210.
25 See id.
259 ROMMEN, supra note 6, at 52.
260 Id.
261 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 111 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Classics
1985) (1651).
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founded on the mere absolute will of God without participation in
His essence, so all oughtness or obligation rests solely on the
same absolute will."2 62 Reality and essence derived from divine
wisdom are no longer the basis of purpose; the will determines
direction. Therefore, action cannot be judged by an unchanging
standard because the will is always subject to change. "An action
is not good because of its suitableness to the essential nature of
man, wherein God's archetypal idea of man is represented
according to being and oughtness, but because God so wills."263
This has major implications for the nature of law. For Occam,
because will is the guide of human action, the basis of law must
be will as well. The validity of law rests in its relation to the will
of the lawmaker. 264  This allows the natural law to resemble
positive law. For Occam, the natural law is wholly an expression
of the will of the lawmaker and has no relation to a set of
unchanging norms. This is precisely because the foundation of
norms is now a will that is subject to change. Law then has no
relation to an objective order. "Law is will, pure will without any
foundation in reality, without foundation in the essential nature
of things."26 5 There is no teleological element in an Occamist
world. Occam only sees arbitrary instances rather than an order
founded on essence.2 66 Moral goodness, which usually derives its
foundation from correspondence with one's purpose and objective
norms, is wholly subject to the whims of God.2 67 Simon extends
the implications of this perspective:
[F] or Occam 'all depends on the divine will as ultimate cause-
the essences of things, the possible and the impossible.' There
are no unchangeable laws, nothing right or wrong in itself:
'. . theft, adultery, and even hating God are not wrong in
themselves, for God can command them, and then they become
meritorious.'268
To make the will primary is to ignore the reality of essence,
including the essence of God, which is divine wisdom.




266 Id. at 52-53 ("Occam, who sees only individual phenomena, not universals,
the concepts of essences . . .
267 See id. at 53.
2. SIMON, supra note 158, at 34 (alteration in original).
180
2012] JURISPRUDENCE OF SAINT THOMAS MORE
Occam's viewpoint laid the foundation for later thinkers who
ultimately advanced the causes of legal voluntarism and
positivism. Hobbes' completely sovereign "Leviathan" closely
resembles Occam's God. 26 9 Norms of right and wrong and justice
are at the discretion of the sovereign and wholly products of its
will.2 7 0 Simon details Occam's contribution to legal voluntarism:
Legal voluntarism, ... the theory that law is primarily an act of
sovereign will and, at the limit, an arbitrary decree of an
absolute, unenlightened, irrational will, is historically
associated in a remarkably constant fashion with voluntarism
as a general philosophic position, i.e., with the theory that
primacy belongs not to the true but to the good and that the
higher faculty is not the intellect but the will.271
Occam's position detailing the primacy of the will laid the
foundation for political theorists such as Rousseau who
emphasized the "sovereign will" as the only valid basis of
authority in a state.2 72 This will, regardless of its intentions or
apparent heinousness, is always valid. - As Simon points out,
goodness, which often reduces to usefulness in such a system, is
subject to the whims of the legislators rather than any existing
body of norms based on objective essences in reality. 2 73
Bentham argues that his utility principle may serve as the
basis of positive law; for him, law rests on utility rather than
morals.27 4 John Austin "sought to show what law really is, as
opposed to moral or natural law notions of what it ought to be." 7
Law and morals are separate.2 76 Law is a creation of society, but
not in the same sense as for More, who noted how the natural
269 See ROMMEN, supra note 6, at 54-55.
270 Hobbes writes, after acknowledging the Leviathan as the truest
representative of the Commonwealth and absolutely sovereign, that the Leviathan
"is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of prescribing the Rules, whereby
every man may know, what Goods he may enjoy and what Actions he may doe [sic]."
HOBBES, supra note 261, at 233-34. Further, "[11awes [sic] are the Rules of Just, and
Unjust; nothing being reputed Unjust, that is not contrary to some Law. Likewise,
that none can make Lawes [sic] but the Common-wealth; because our Subjection is
to the Common-wealth only." Id. at 312.
271 SIMON, supra note 158, at 61.
272 ROMMEN, supra note 6, at 81 (discussing Rousseau's political philosophy).
273 SIMON, supra note 158, at 61.
274 See Blakey, Lecture Notes on Positivism, supra note 177.
275 FREEMAN, supra note 188, at 255.
276 See id. at 262 (stating that the positivist aspect of Austinianism is most
evident in the separation of laws and morals).
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law written in human nature informs the creation of positive
law. 211 In contrast, legal positivists ground law in logical
preference conveyed through expressions of sovereignty.
Austin is one of the major positivist thinkers to outline such
a framework of law. His goal was to use logic for law in the same
way that Newton built physics from basic math.7 For Austin,
the appropriate goal of jurisprudence is positive law, which is the
product of an independent community.79 This definition of
human law sharply contrasts with Aquinas' notion of law as a
rule promulgated by legitimate authority for the common good.
Austin's definition of law is devoid of reference to higher
principles and prioritizes authority or the lawmaker. Hence, the
basis of law is "command," or will: "[E]very law or rule is a
command.""2 0  This theory contrasts with that of Hart, who
founds law on a dual system of rules: primary and secondary
rules. Primary rules are general standards and rules of
obligation, whereas secondary rules specify primary rules in
application. 28 ' Hence, the secondary rules are "mainly procedural
and remedial."28 2 In other words, they are concerned with the
"nitty gritty" of law.
Austin's conception detaches law from morality: "The science
ofjurisprudence ... is concerned with positive laws, or with laws
strictly so called, as considered without regard to their goodness
or badness."2  The goodness or badness of laws is irrelevant to
their legitimacy as forces directing human action. Finally, for
Austin, law is determinate; it is the product of logic, which can
touch multiple areas of activity and craft solutions to legal
problems.28 Logic fills the gaps of law in order to create a
framework into which humans can fit.
277 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 48.
278 See Blakey, Lecture Notes on Positivism, supra note 177.
279 See J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Hart ed., 1954), in
LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 188, at 291, 291 ("The
matter of jurisprudence is positive law: law, simply and strictly so called: or law set
by political superiors to political inferiors.").
280 Id. at 292.
281 See FREEMAN, supra note 188, at 268.
282 Id.
2" Austin, supra note 279, at 294.
28 See Blakey, Lecture Notes on Thomas Aquinas, supra note 150.
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D. Justice
For More, an objective standard of the good life, cognizant of
the importance of cultivating virtue, informs the meaning of
justice and its unavoidable relationship to law. The roots of
More's conception of justice are Aristotelian."8 In this sense,
More fits into Michael Sandel's third theory of justice, namely
that characterized by the pursuit of "virtue." Sandel summarizes
theories of justice into three types.2 86 The first defines justice as
corresponding to the maximization of welfare; utilitarianism and
other philosophical theories that calculate goods dominate this
theory.287 The second type cites freedom as its starting point and
prioritizes autonomy and equality. 288 Kant and Rawls are its
chief exponents. Finally, the last category sees virtue as the
proper indicator of justice.2 9 More's theory of justice, informed
by Christian theology and the thought of Aquinas, parallels the
theories in Sandel's third category, with a few modifications.
For More, justice entails giving of "what is due." The concept
of "what is due," which is an admittedly ambiguous phrase on its
surface, follows from his understanding of human nature and the
purpose of life, which was outlined above.29 o Justice corresponds
to the good life, which Christian ideals inform. This is why
More's conception of justice has Aristotelian roots. Aristotle also
understood justice as related to essence or telos.291 For Aristotle,
"what is due" corresponds to the purpose of a thing in a given
situation.2 92 This is why distributive justice depends on the
essence of the thing being distributed and the merit surrounding
the person on the receiving end.9
Similarly, More's conception of justice flows from his
understanding of human nature. Aquinas holds that "a thing is
said to be just in human affairs when it is right because it follows
285 See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT'S THE RIGHT THING To Do? 9 (2009)
("Aristotle teaches that justice means giving people what they deserve. [Liaw can't
be neutral on questions of the good life.").
286 Id. at 19.
287 See id.
288 See id. at 9, 19-20.
289 See id. at 20.
2" See supra notes 93-108 and accompanying text.
291 SANDEL, supra note 285, at 186.
282 See id. at 187-88.
293 See id.
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the rule of reason."194  As mentioned above, the first rule of
reason is the law of nature."9 Justice involves the rule of reason,
which is distinctly human and related to the cultivation of virtue,
in particular circumstances. Hence, for More, reason is key to
justice.29 6 Justice corresponds to goodness and right and what is
due.29 1 More famously told one of his sons-in-law: "[S]on, I
assure [you] on my faith, that if the parties will at my hands call
for justice, then ... [even ifJ my father stood on the one side and
the devil on the other, his cause being good, the devil should have
right."2 98 "What is due" relates to what the good to be pursued is
in a given situation, which is informed by the unchanging nature
of things. Prudence is the process of properly applying the norm
to particular circumstances.29 9
More's refusal to adhere to the oath written by Cromwell
after passage of the Act of Succession further demonstrates his
understanding of justice as human law in accordance with the
dictates of reason and God. More viewed his incarceration as
unjust because the oath articulated by Cromwell did not have
proper authorization.3 0 0  He wrote to his daughter Meg,
expressing his frustration: "[T]hey that have committed me
[here], for refusing of this oath not agreeable to the statute, are
not by their own law able to justify my imprisonment." 0' Thus,
for More, a law that does not correspond to reason because it
stems from usurpation of authority is inherently unjust.
Further, More's conflict with the crown demonstrates the
primacy of conscience in his conception of justice: "Because
conscience is the faculty by which fundamental issues of good
and evil are manifest to all human beings, even the most corrupt,
More considered it to be the metaphysical foundation for law and
2 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Pt. I-II, Q. 95, Art. 2 (Fathers
of the English Dominican Province trans., 1947).
295 AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW, supra note 205, at 36-43.
296 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 39, 97 ("[O1nly when
reason reigns can some measure ofjustice and peace be realized.").
297 See id. at 188.
299 ROPER & HARPSFIELD, supra note 28, at 21-22 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
2 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 101, at 89.
3" See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 162.
301 ROPER & HARPSFIELD, supra note 28, at 38 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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justice."30 2 In other words, conscience is a vehicle for promoting
both individual and communal justice. A conscience that
perceives and reasons rightly can pursue justice properly.
More's conception of justice strongly contrasts with Sandel's
first and second categories. Sandel summarizes the first type as
characterizing justice as the maximization of welfare."o3
Bentham, Mill, and utilitarianism in general dominate this
approach. Welfare involves the greatest amount of happiness for
the greatest number of people. Happiness is a measure of
pleasure and pain. The maximization of pleasure leads to more
happiness, at least in Bentham's framework.30 4 While the
pleasure principle is the theory's first and clarifying principle, it
is also arguably its weakest because it is probably impossible to
maintain a consistent definition of pleasure, or utility for that
matter.3 0 ' The currency of utilitarianism is subject to change
according to the preferences of those involved. Similarly,
Bentham's utilitarianism does not allow for a prioritization of
pleasures or recognize different values between them.0 Finally,
the utilitarian conception of justice leaves no room for
recognizing individual rights or claims. It prioritizes the good of
all, whatever that is, over individual needs, regardless of their
legitimacy, in every situation.ao7
John Stuart Mill sought to resolve this problem by wedding
utility and welfare to liberty. For Mill, the maximization of
welfare, and therefore justice, involves pursuing the greatest
amount of utility that remains cognizant of individual liberty.0 s
Mill maintains a hierarchy of utility that corresponds to
majoritarian preference aware of liberty interests.30 9 This relates
to Mill's harm principle, which articulates the idea that
government should not interfere with individual liberty absent
physical harm.1 o But this does not truly resolve the main
problem of utilitarianism, namely how to prevent calculations
from devolving into subjectivism. This is because the harm
302 WEGEMER, MORE ON STATESMANSHIP, supra note 115, at 184.
303 See SANDEL, supra note 285, at 34-35.
3 See id.
305 See id. at 41.
3 See id.
307 See id. at 37.
30s See id. at 50.
See id. at 54.
310 See id. at 49.
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principle is only cognizant of physical harm. It ignores the
possibility of unjust circumstances that extend beyond tangible
negatives. It prioritizes liberty, even if it is intangibly
destructive, over invisible and intangible goods that remain
significant for the health of the community. Justice, because it
only involves calculations cognizant of restraints on physical
liberty as they relate to welfare, is devoid of intangible goods
such as virtue, upheld by thinkers like More.
More's understanding of justice also differs from theories of
justice premised on individual freedom. Libertarianism and the
thought of Kant infuse this line of thinking. Rights, flowing from
the autonomy of individuals and the human capacity to reason,
inform the meaning of justice. The basis of these rights is
rationality, which demands dignity and respect."' For Kant,
morality is the product of acting out of duty from a self-
prescribed universal law known as the categorical imperative
and that is the product of autonomy.1 12 True freedom equals
action in accordance with this self-made, albeit universally
applied, duty. Freedom is the organizing principle for morality
and justice. This implicitly recognizes the anti-individual
calculation of utilitarianism and recognizes the harmonizing of
individual freedom as key to justice. Because humans maintain
intrinsic worth due to their rationality as well as certain rights,
they must be treated as ends, and thereby cannot fit into a
utilitarian calculation. Yet Kant's theory sharply contrasts with
More's conception because it locates duty in individual freedom to
craft universalized moral law.313 On the contrary, More conceives
duty as related to the intrinsic nature of human beings, namely
their orientation to pursue good. More's pursuit of justice is more
other-regarding than the Kantian notion, which springs forth
from individual freedom.
Freedom also infuses John Rawls' conception of justice,
which prioritizes fairness as the product of choice. Justice is
fairness because individuals would choose what is fair if they did
not have other obligations and wore a "veil of ignorance."3 14
Hence, for Rawls, justice equals distribution in a situation of
an See id. at 107.
312 See id. at 123-24. .
313 See id.
31 Id. at 141.
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equality characterized by truly free choice.3 15 In his hypothetical
veil of ignorance scenario, Rawls postulates that individuals
would choose equal liberty as an organizing principle of justice.16
Basic rights, rather than certain goods, would be the outcome of
his thought experiment. Further, with the exception of
inequality that is in the form of advantage, especially for the
least fortunate, social and economic equality are essential to
justice. Rawls' theory levels individuals in society and focuses on
justice at an institutional level. This contrasts with More, who
like Aquinas and other Ancient thinkers, recognized the
significance of different levels in society. While More might
agree that the assignment of talent is arbitrary, or at least due to
God, More would utilize those talents to societal advantage
rather than equalizing individuals and then moving forward.
E. The Role of Judges in Implementing Values
Thomas More thought that judges should always remain
cognizant of, and actively draw from, natural theories of
justice.1 Judges must act in accordance with the law as well as
justice, which is why More would rule for the devil if he had the
better case. Impartial judicial functioning is an aspect of justice:
"'However bitter an enemy to me a man may be, or however
much he may have injured me, I will not allow this to prejudice
his case in court, where justice must be administered
impartially....' "318
"I1 See id. at 142, 151-63 (discussing how equality would emerge from the "veil
of ignorance").
316 While this seems to make sense on the surface, it is subject to three common
sensical criticisms. First, Rawls presumes, like Locke, that a state of nature should
inform notions of justice despite the fact that the state of nature is completely
opposed to actual human experience. Second, Rawls' framework assumes that each
generation would choose the same situation as the one that came before, without
providing a basis for the validity of such an assumption given human experience.
Finally, why does Rawls believe that humans will act risk averse? Human beings
decide to roll the dice-both literally and figuratively-all the time in their everyday
lives. Why should we assume that the hypothetical state of nature would be any
different?
317 See WEGEMER, MORE ON STATESMANSHIP, supra note 115, at 212 ("To
implement, interpret, and improve a nation's laws, the wise statesman must have a
thorough knowledge of his nation's laws, traditions, and literature as well as a
thorough knowledge of human nature.").
318 THOMAS STAPLETON, THE LIFE AND ILLUSTRIOUS MARTYRDOM OF SIR
THOMAS MORE 23 (E.E. Reynolds ed., Philip E. Hallett trans., 1966).
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Significantly, More did not shy away from the idea that a
judge's personal moral view could impact decision-making. John
Guy noted how "'his great contribution was exactly this: to
rejuvenate the ancient theory that judges had a personal duty in
conscience to see right done by all whose business was
entertained in the courts they directed.' ""1 Yet given More's
adherence to traditional natural law theory his view of
conscience was likely objective. Conscience was not an outlet for
subjectivism or relativism.
More's canons of statutory interpretation are not evident in
his writing. The most visible example is his response to the
statute responsible for his death. More greatly disputed the
construction given by his prosecutors; he focused on the
definition of the word "malice" in the statute. More explained
that the word "malice" had a precise meaning in the law.3 20 More
held that in the statute it meant: "'forcible'. . . in the statute of
forcible entries, by which statute, if a man enter peaceably, and
[did not] put . .. his adversary out forcibly, it is no offence. But if
he put him out forcibly, then by that statute it is an offence, and
so shall he be punished."3 2 1 He insisted that the testimony of
Richard Rich, which consisted of hearsay about chance
conversations with More, did not indicate malice in this sense. 3 22
This communicates at least minimal adherence to text and legal
definitions, as well as a concept of stare decisis.
More's most famous defense, silence, also indicates his
comprehension of the fundamental premise of criminal law: that
the evidence must be sufficient to convict. The statute
criminalized verbal representations and manifestations of
disobedience. With passion and wit, More pointed out that
silence is not a crime under a proper interpretation of the text of
the statute. In fact, he reminded the prosecutors that if silence
meant anything, it meant consent.32 3  In this sense, More
39 WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 135.
320 Id. at 213.
321 ROPER & HARPSFIELD, supra note 28, at 44.
322 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 213.
31 Id. at 211. Robert Bolt dramatized this famous argument in a stirring scene
in his play A Man For All Seasons:
Cromwell: [Tihis silence betokened-nay, this silence was not silence at all
but most eloquent denial.
More: Not so, Master Secretary, the maxim is 'qui tacet consentire.' The
maxim of the law is 'Silence gives consent.' If, therefore, you wish to
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preached fidelity to the law on the books; Cromwell's
characterization of his silence conflicted with legal precedent and
was therefore legally unsound. The law, as articulated, is what
binds, rather than the caprice of authority.32 4
More's canons of constitutional analysis are also difficult to
know, although at the end of his trial he did shift his defense to
two perennial questions that confront both lawyers and judges.
First, More questioned the legitimacy of the statute rather than
his guilt or innocence by citing contradictions in English law. He
claimed that the Act of Succession and the Act of Treason
conflicted with other statutes.3 2 5 They conflicted with legal
precedent and legal traditions, including the Magna Carta, which
acknowledged religious freedom.3 26 Second, More questioned the
legitimacy of the judges' authority:
Forasmuch as, my lord, ... this indictment is grounded upon an
Act of Parliament directly repugnant to the laws of God and his
Holy Church, the supreme government of which or of any part
whereof, may no temporal Prince presume by any law to take
upon him, as rightfully belonging to the See of Rome, a spiritual
pre-eminence by the mouth of Our Saviour himself, personally
construe what my silence 'betokened,' you must construe that I consented,
not that I denied.
... This Court must construe according to the law.
ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS: A PLAY IN TWO ACTS 151-52 (1st Vintage
Int'l 1990) (1960).
324 Bolt also communicates this idea, after More's son-in-law, Roper, cannot
understand why More will not arrest Richard Rich for perceived immorality:
ROPER: Arrest him.
MORE: For what?
ROPER: For libel; he's a spy.
MARGARET: Father, that man's bad.
MORE: There is no law against that.
ROPER: There is! God's law!
MORE: Then God can arrest him.
... The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal not what's right. And I'll
stick to what's legal.
ROPER: Then you set man's law above God's!
MORE: No, far below; but let me draw your attention to a fact-I'm not God.
BOLT, supra note 323, at 65-66.
325 See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 216.
326 See id. at 216-17.
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present upon the earth, only to St Peter and his
successors,. . . it is therefore in law amongst Christian men
insufficient to charge any Christian man.327
More points to both divine and natural law and questions the
authority of the judges to enforce a statute that contradicted first
principles of the Christian faith. This implicitly acknowledges a
hierarchy of law. Human statutes-and for that matter
constitutions-cannot conflict with divine and moral precepts.
The written law cannot transgress the unwritten law made
known to humans through reason and revelation. Human law,
whether in the form of a constitution or legislative statute, has
limits that judges should recognize and acknowledge when
deciding cases. Chief Justice Fitz-James did not answer More's
challenge to the legitimacy of the statute.3 28
Interestingly, More also took a stab at the problem of
majoritarianism. For More, majorities cannot trump firm legal
principles:
If the number of Bishops and Universities [should] be so
material as your lordship seemeth to take it, then see I little
cause, my lord, why that thing in my conscience should make
any change. [I]f I should speak of those which already be dead,
of whom many be now Holy Saints in heaven, I am very sure it
is the far greater part of them that, all the while they lived,
thought in this case that way that I think now.329
Thus, More puts squarely on the table the problem of
majoritarianism in political societies founded on the rule of law
and constitutions; he acknowledges that majority will cannot
trump established legal traditions and principles enshrined in
the particular political and legal system.
2 ROPER & HARPSFIELD, supra note 28, at 45 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
328 In fact, he told his fellow justices: "'I must needs [sic] confess that if the Act
of Parliament be not unlawful, then is not the indictment in my conscience
insufficient.' " Id. at 46. In other words, the Chief Justice obfuscated the question by
making his assent to conviction conditional; his fellow justices did not catch his
rhetorical trick and merely consented to his position of guilt for More.
329 Id.
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More's writing on the problem of publicly serving in
inherently fallible public institutions informs his view on the role
of judges in implementing values. In Utopia, More writes:
There is another philosophy that is better suited for political
action, that takes its cue, adapts itself to the [play] in hand, and
acts its part neatly and well. [D]on't arrogantly force strange
ideas on people who you [must] know have set their minds on a
different course from yours. You must strive to influence policy
indirectly, handle the situation[s] tactfully.330
This statement is a remarkable expression of the traditional
virtue of prudence. More acknowledges the difficulty of seeking
to do good when the circumstances appear bad. Practicality, or
pragmatism, is the governing standard, while remaining
cognizant of the good to be pursued. This is partially why More
refused to be polemical upon losing favor with King Henry VIII.
Preserving his reputation enabled him to continue to promote
peace and justice. 3 ' More answered the question of obedience to
the bad law in the same vein as Aquinas. Judges should defend
laws that are good while prudently giving advice to change those
that are not.332 Further, the inefficacy or imperfection of a law is
no reason to disobey it. The rule of law should remain for the
sake of institutional integrity and stability.3 In this vein, More
would probably caution judges to seek to change the law for the
good, within the proper boundaries of their authority, while
recognizing the value of prudence.
IV. EVALUATING MORE'S JURISPRUDENCE
More's philosophy of law is fundamentally sound, coherent,
and amenable to human communities because its basis is human
experience and characteristics of human nature. This makes his
jurisprudence attractive from the outset, precisely because it
seeks to respond to reality and the realistic demands intrinsic to
society. His conception of human nature, which follows Aquinas
330 UTOPIA, supra note 2, at 25-26.
' See WEGEMER, PORTRAIT OF COURAGE, supra note 7, at 157.
332 AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW, supra note 205, at 55-58, 61 (discussing human
obedience to unjust laws and reform of bad laws); see A THOMAS MORE
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 257.
' Compare A THOMAS MORE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 257, with President
Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois
(Jan. 27, 1838), available at http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/incoln/speeches/
lyceum.htm (discussing the relationship between law and order).
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and is based on experience and philosophy, guides his theory of
law and its place in society. In other words, understanding
reality, in all of its aspects, rather than the pure logic and science
of positivism, is the foundation of his philosophy of law. More's
jurisprudence is therefore holistic and rightly attuned to the
complexities that are present in human communities, including
the competing demands of objective notions of morality and
communal expectations. It recognizes humans as rational, moral
actors and leaves room for morality and law to overlap. Further,
by recognizing law as under-determinate, More's understanding
provides space for human ingenuity, adaption to changing
circumstances, and discretion through character. In this sense, it
implicitly prioritizes the virtue of prudence in legal practice.
Thus, I find More's philosophy of law properly grounded and
preferable, albeit with a few caveats. First, it is difficult to see
how More's jurisprudence fits neatly and completely into the
modern American political and legal regime. Second, More's
system may need to be modified in a significantly pluralistic
society.
A. Philosophy of Law in General
1. The Purpose of Life and Jurisprudence
The basis of More's jurisprudence is his conception of human
nature and the relationship between human reason and reality.
This is a legitimate starting point for a philosophy of law because
it seeks to account for all of human experience-both internal
and external-in the world. If law is made to govern human
behavior it only makes sense for it to grow out of the complexities
of human experience. More's conception is primarily that of
Aquinas; teleology is the governing principle, with deference to
the teachings of Christian theology, either through philosophical
speculation or the teachings of Scripture. 3 4 More's prioritization
of developing virtue, both personally and communally through
institutions such as the law as a response to the demands of
human nature, reflects a proper understanding of the nature of
human affairs and the role of law. Indeed, it prioritizes the
truths of metaphysics over the demonstrable and visible facts
. See supra Part III.C.
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born from experience that are the foundation of positive law."3
The legitimacy of legal philosophy is contingent on recognizing
the limitations of the positive law, which implies something
greater; metaphysics, or a philosophy of being, is the only set of
truths capable of filling this gap because it is the foundation of
all science.3
Put simply, reliance on the natural law, which appears in
human nature, keeps objective morality and law related in
everyday life. As Rommen states, "the teleological conception,
grounded in the metaphysics of being, is therefore the basis of
the essential unity of being and oughtness, of being and
goodness."3 Teleology, grounded in metaphysics, gives
individuals, as well as communities, a reason for choosing the
rules that they adopt. More's approach to the law recognizes that
jurisprudence is a normative science, subject to the highest
science of metaphysics.3 38 More knew the limits of the law, as an
institution bound by the truths of higher sciences:
"[J]urisprudence is a systematic formulation of judgments about
the general and particular positive institutions of the legal order:
their existence, essence, sources, principles, normative coherence,
validity in space and time."3
2. Natural Law and Positive Law
Positive law derives its legitimacy from natural law. This is
because the natural law comes from a natural lawgiver,
regardless of whether it is the Christian God or not, and is a
product of the science of metaphysics, which is the highest
science. The simple fact is that reality reflects order. Everything
that exists, from inanimate objects to living things like human
beings, has a place within the order and therefore a purpose.
The purpose of human beings can be deduced from observing
s'- See ROMMEN, supra note 6, at 141 ("The idea of natural law obtains general
acceptance only in the periods when metaphysics, queen of the sciences, is
dominant."). Some argue that theoretical and philosophical speculation is not the
only path to recognizing the significance of metaphysics. Trial and error through raw
human experience informs the science of metaphysics as well.
"6 See id. at 141-42 ("If moral philosophy and, in moral philosophy and with it,
legal philosophy are to have a solid foundation, they must be a continuation of
metaphysics."). The philosophy of metaphysics is a topic that is probably beyond the
direct scope of this Article.
33 Id. at 150.
338 See id. at 162.
3 Id.
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their natural tendencies and needs. The institution of human
law, itself a product and response to human nature, should not
be any different.340 As Rommen eloquently summarizes:
[L]aw, through its inclusion in moral philosophy, was given its
metaphysical basis. The science of law received its foundation,
the philosophy of law its objects, and positive legal institutions
their legitimation in the natural law, which in its turn rested
upon social philosophy and hence upon the metaphysical
doctrine of man. The oughtness or obligation of legal norms also
obtained thereby a material foundation in the essential being of
man's social and rational nature.3 4
Law is one science, incapable of being comprehensive, and
incapable of being based entirely on something other than the
nature of things. It is under the umbrella of ethics, which is a
science dominated by norms founded on reason.3 42
More is correct when he recognizes the legitimacy of law as a
function of its relationship to reason. More's understanding
leaves room for a system of law called to higher purposes that
reflect the demands of human nature. Human reason, tempered
by accessible moral norms, judges the goodness and soundness of
law because reason can abstract the goodness of things from the
start.3 43 Reason is constant and unchanging, whereas will or
command, which is the foundation of positivism, is subject to the
whims of individuals and communities. Founding law on will is
like placing family decisions in the hands of a child in a candy
shop. Desire and will, because they are not the highest faculties
of human nature, cannot be the foundation of the institution that
governs human action. Reason, intrinsically connected to
purpose, provides a guide for the construction of law: "Without
purpose, action would be meaningless; without purpose, the will
has nothing to strive for."3" Put simply it is impossible to avoid
the basic fact that "deliberation," which is a function of reason,
precedes "decree," which corresponds to the will. 3 45 Any other
type of lawmaking is blind without reference to purpose. This is
troubling for numerous reasons, such as the legitimacy of law,
340 See id. at 164 ("To this complex reality correspond various sciences which
concern themselves with man inasmuch as he belongs to these worlds.").
341 Id.
34 See id. at 165.
s See id. at 172.
34 Id. at 169.
14 See id. at 174.
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the stability of a whimsical legal system, and the absence of
static norms that bind people together. From an individual
perspective, a legal regime characterized by positivism does little
to safeguard individuals. In a system dominated by will and
command as the foundation of law, the majority is always right.
Grounding law in the will makes it impossible to distinguish
between might and right. Individuals are prone to become lost in
the shuffle.* Protecting liberty requires reference to objective
goods worthy of free pursuit.
More's understanding of law as a limited institution founded
on reason and reflective of human nature leaves ample room for
the best of both worlds. It allows metaphysics, and thereby
morality, to inform legal norms. "[T]he natural law need not
stand diametrically opposed to the positive law, nor has such an
opposition always existed in history."34 7 It enables human
beings, rational and free, to craft positive laws that correspond to
peculiar individual and communal needs. Because More
recognizes positive law as under-determinate, his system
provides humans significant freedom to craft rules that reflect
the needs of the specific community. His philosophy of law
encourages prudent adaptation in the field of law. At the same
time, the scheme provides a baseline of norms that should not be
transgressed and a consistent and coherent framework for
human advancement. Order and freedom, wedded, but the
product of the good, promote stability and flourishing on both a
social and individual level.
The theory that the law is under-determinate leaves ample
freedom to human communities. Strict positivism is unnecessary
for freedom, and indeed falsely guarantees freedom, within a
system of law. This is because "natural law ... contains but a
few universal norms and forgoes deductive extremes."348 It does
not presume human infallibility and thereby promotes humility,
31 See id. at 177 ("The genius of legal reason cannot, therefore, rest content
with self-denying positivism."). Sheer will was the foundation of law in Nazi
Germany. The positive law had no limits because it implicitly denied the reality of
an objective ethical order limiting the scope of the law.
3 Id. at 221.
31 Id. at 222. Law is not strictly a product of deduction; it is a matter of
judgment-or prudence for that matter-in the same vein as Aquinas' concept of
"determinatio." Legal positivism cannot withstand the deficiencies of human
language or the realities of human fallibility, which require adaptation through
human discretion.
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which in turn generates watchfulness. To be sure, it provides a
baseline of principles that serve as starting points for prudential
application. But it simultaneously enables and encourages
human ingenuity in the face of new problems. It is like a
"skeleton law," informing the rightness of laws but not
mandating specific positive prescriptions." Therefore, a legal
regime that recognizes the legitimacy of unwritten moral norms
adequately accommodates the realities of objective morality and
the demands of modern freedom. Such a system acknowledges
that humans can be lawmakers as long as they make law rightly
or in accordance with certain dictates of justice. Indeed, this is
how humans work for justice, namely by linking their earthly
activities, such as positive lawmaking, with unchanging moral
norms. The more the positive law reflects the natural law, and
thereby imbues the community with a sense of justice, the less
visible natural law must be in society."so
More's understanding of law, while defensible
philosophically, is also defensible by simply pointing to history.
Every single legal regime that has ever existed has pointed to
higher norms. Roman Senators, medieval lawyers,
Congressmen, members of Parliament, presidents, and judges
"continually appeal to morality; and every revolutionary relies
upon a moral, higher law of justice in his opposition to the
positive law."35 ' This raw fact suggests, at the very least, a
human inclination to recognize right and wrong when crafting
organizing principles of society.
Finally, More's approach to unjust laws is workable because
it recognizes the relationship between positive law and order
while remaining cognizant of the limitations of positive law.
More did not actively seek to uproot the unjust law that cost him
his life; instead of running a campaign, he led by example. He
was a silent martyr in this sense. He obeyed his conscience on a
personal level while simultaneously speaking to thousands
through his actions, thereby prudently promoting justice and
order.
us See id.
350 See id. at 230 ("The natural law calls, then, for the positive law. This
explains why the natural law, though it is the enduring basis and norm of the
positive law, progressively withdraws, as it were, behind the curtain of the positive
law as the latter achieves a continually greater perfection.").
351 See id. at 178.
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B. Justice
More's refusal to accept the principle that the "ends justify
the means" properly accounts for human dignity.
Consequentialism may be used to justify subjective
totalitarianism. Its content is subject to the whim of the
decision-maker and his or her preferences. This is because it is
impossible to quantify, assign value to, and prioritize human
goods that are intangible, such as freedom, family, faith, and
pleasure, amongst others. Yet this is precisely the aim of
consequentialist calculation. Preferring one set of consequences
according to efficiency or pleasure depends on the definition
assigned to those values, which devolves into subjective
preferentialism.
It is impossible to prevent utilitarianism from devolving into
a slippery slope because it does not evaluate the nature of acts.
In other words, the nature of things and acts do not inform moral
calculations. The justice of the pursuit depends on the value
placed on the thing by the particular calculator rather than any
objective norm. This is why utilitarianism provides solid ground
to justify disproportionate punishment or harm to the innocent. 5 2
On the contrary, evaluating actions according to their intrinsic
moral value, as reflected in the nature of things, is the only way
to determine the validity of such actions in particular situations.
Acting for a good purpose does not make that act good in itself.
The goodness of individual acts depends on the nature of those
acts, which informs the pursuit of goals in the future.
Cognizance of the essence of things-as well as actions-is a
proper foundation of justice because it seeks to abstract
principles of behavior from the nature of reality rather than
subjective goods.
Another problem with consequentialism is there is no
distinction between intended and foreseen consequences. The
principle of double effect, articulated by natural law theorists, is
instructive on the relevance of intentionality to the moral value
of certain acts. Catholic act analysis analyzes the nature of the
352 Even under a consequentialist framework that prioritizes something most
consider valuable, like life for example, unnecessary harm can occur. This is because
such a scheme cannot articulate a principle to prevent non-lethal harm in the name
of preserving life. By what principle will the torturer stop torturing in the name of
saving lives? It all depends on the utility of the torture and the torturer's definition
of utility on top of that.
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act as well as the intentions of the actor when passing moral
judgment. Utilitarianism partially ignores the first step and fails
to account for the relevance of the second consideration. Hence,
there is no limit to the range of actions, provided that
subjectively assigned consequences that are pursued are
preferable. Thus, in a situation that will inevitably result in two
consequences, one good and one bad, Aquinas' principle of double
effect is preferable. It requires a morally good or at least
indifferent act to serve as the means as well as no willing of the
bad effect. This permits bad consequences some of the time
without leading to absurd assignments of culpability. Unlike
utilitarianism, it limits the scope of those bad consequences
according to the nature of the act involved rather than the wants
and desires of the individual actor.
Finally, implicit in the above discussion is the idea that
utilitarianism and other consequentialist systems allow for using
humans as instruments. This is contrary to human dignity
because any given human situation accounts for innumerable
interests, tangible and intangible, that might be unjustly lost in
the shuffle given the reality of intrinsic moral goods.
C. American Pluralism, the Prioritization of Liberty, and the
Need for Dialectic in Law
More's understanding of law, as a promoter of virtue, does
not perfectly correspond with basic American principles. In the
United States, the first principle of societal organization is
liberty. This flows from the nation's natural rights and Lockean
roots.5 Indeed, many of the Founders acknowledged how the
primary purpose of government is to secure rights. 35 4  Rights
precede law and consent is the foundation of legitimate
authority. However, a simply Lockean perspective is misleading
and ignorant of the long-standing influence of Classical and
Catholic natural law theory on political society in history.
Elements of traditional natural law theory exist in the
philosophy characteristic of the American Founding, although
353 See MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC: STUDIES IN THE
FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 10 (1996) ("No thread runs
through the tangle of American politics more clearly than rights.").
1* See id. at 27 ("Government is instituted to secure rights .... The security of
rights can be the only legitimate end of political society.").
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they are not central. This is arguably the genius of the American
experiment; it wedded a theory that adequately accounts for the
often-tenuous relationship between liberty and authority with
the practical, political, and historical realities of the American
people and continent at the time of the creation of the United
States. Although it certainly does not dominate, strains of
traditional natural law appear in the origin of the Union,55
natural rights, 35 6 the principle of consent,3" and the Founders'
emphasis on virtue.358
"I' Many scholars do not give enough credit to the idea that the formation of the
American Republic was somewhat organic and not entirely the product of social
contract. Orestes Brownson noted how the Union existed in fact before its legal
existence under the Constitution. Indeed, the contents of the Union developed
naturally and remained the same even following independence. The Union acted
wholly together following independence. Brownson notes how the unwritten
constitution, namely the Union which developed organically, is the organizational
principle rather than the Constitution written on paper. The Declaration of
Independence seemingly expresses the ontological reality of this Union. Without the
organic Union there is no Declaration and without the Declaration there is no
Constitution. The fact is that the Union was a natural reality regardless of whether
it was expressed on paper or not. See generally O.A. BROWNSON, THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC: CONSTITUTION, TENDENCIES, AND DESTINY (1866). President Lincoln,
during the Civil War, argued that the reality of the Union, expressed but not made
by the Declaration of Independence, legitimized the Constitution. See HARRY V.
JAFFA, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE COMING OF THE
CIVIL WAR 39 (2000).
35 While Founding-era philosophy consistently speaks of natural rights, one
should remember that these natural rights are still the offspring of the "law of
nature." It is true that the Founders recognize rights as foundational to their
political theory; but these rights are only part of the foundation. Bernard Bailyn
notes that the American experiment was a combination of liberty and the
glorification of human nature. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 20 (1992). Arguably, the Constitution itself reflects the
idea that rights are only part of Founding philosophy; it should be remembered that
the first draft of the Constitution consisted entirely of institutional organization.
The Bill of Rights was only added after the fact. See id. at 67-68. Hence, it is
plausible to argue that the American regime weds liberty with higher principles of
law. It seeks to resolve the tension between freedom and authority perceived by
social contract theorists by recognizing the relationship between liberty and
governmental power. This allows it to at least reflect traditional natural law, which
recognizes the place of liberty within a larger political philosophy and at the service
of objective norms that are the real foundation of law.
m Recognizing the principle of consent as an element of the foundation of
legitimate authority is not entirely antithetical to traditional understandings of law
and authority. This is because the natural law recognizes human equality as an
organizing principle; numerous Catholic natural law theorists recognize the effect of
consent on the moral legitimacy of authority. See JOHN A. RYAN & FRANCIS J.
BOLAND, CATHOLIC PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS 75 (1948). The blunt reality is that
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While a product of the natural law rather than rights
tradition, More's understanding of human nature that
acknowledges human equality at least ensures that his
philosophy is not diametrically opposed to the founding
principles of the United States and democratic regimes in
general.' This is because it recognizes the significance of
human reason for ordering affairs. Indeed, an objective valuing
of human nature is at the core of the American creed: The
principle of equality, while mostly a product of Locke's natural
rights tradition, is the foundation of the American legal regime.
The equality principle is one of the main reasons that a
system as pluralistic as the United States' can even work.
Pluralism, expressed through religious preference, differing
belief systems, cultural heritage, ethnicity, and other sources is
often perceived as a barrier to a working, coherent, peaceful, and
legitimate legal regime. This is because it enables strong
conflicts between values. But More's conception of law probably
can resolve this difficulty because it grounds law in philosophy,
accessible through reason reflecting on human nature that is
objective and equal all around. Indeed, the Thomistic conception
of law encourages dialectic; the construction of law grows from
deliberation and debate." It encourages bringing diverse
human experiences to the table to inform positive legal norms
deduced from objective moral truths.
More's understanding of law, while not prioritizing liberty,
recognizes the significance of liberty for the legitimacy of law. He
recognizes that the law cannot account for every situation.ae1
This implies a baseline of freedom in everyday human affairs.
The major source of tension between the American presumption
of liberty and More's philosophy of law is the foundation of
consent and cooperation are necessary for communities to exist. This is consonant
with More's understanding of human nature.
351 Many Founders shied away from the Lockean idea that government had no
role in forming the character of citizens. See BAILYN, supra note 356, at 83-84.
359 See Marcello Pera, Relativism, Christianity, and the West, in WITHOUT
ROOTS: THE WEST, RELATIVISM, CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM 1, 26 (Michael F. Moore,
trans., 2006) ("[Dlemocracy places at its very foundations the values of the
individual, dignity, equality, and respect. Deny these values and you deny
democracy.").
360 See ROMMEN, supra note 6, at 219-33.
361 See Blake D. Morant, Lessons From Thomas More's Dilemma of Conscience:
Reconciling the Clash Between a Lawyer's Beliefs and Professional Expectations, 78
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 965, 970-71 (2004).
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binding norms. By prioritizing liberty, the American regime
strongly emphasizes consent rather than intrinsic goodness as
the basis of legitimate authority. Whereas More reflects on
human nature to determine binding norms, the American legal
system often defers to contractual principles-macro and micro,
formal and informal-to create rules. However, this tension is
not impossible to resolve as long as consent is not the preeminent
value. There are plenty of examples in the current legal system
demonstrating this point. For example, consent is not a defense
to certain tort and criminal actions. Individuals do not have
absolute rights to harm themselves. 3 62  Hence, More's belief in
the authority of unarticulated norms is not entirely inconsistent
with the American way of doing things. The American political
regime just develops from the ground up rather than from the top
down. In this sense it prioritizes a sort of reverse prudence."
D. The Role of Judges in Implementing Values
Implementing values is inherently part of the judicial
function.3 6 Every time a judge decides a case, whether through
statutory interpretation, appeals to the principle of stare decisis,
or some other rule of decision, the judge impliedly recognizes
legal norms. These principles can be either written or unwritten
and may not even be expressed. But decision, based on
deliberation, prioritizes some set of values.3 6' The expression of
values is intrinsically related to choice conveying preference.
Therefore, it is impossible to prevent judges from implementing
values.
But this reality of the judicial function provokes two
significant questions. First, it is unclear whether the scope of
implementing values should be restricted. In other words,
362 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705-06 (1997) (holding that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not contain a right to
assisted suicide).
30 Whereas More's philosophy looks to the general moral principle and seeks to
apply it to the particular situation at hand in the form of law, the American system
creates general principles and laws out of particular situations. This is partially due
to the fact that the American regime is simply more democratic and recognizes "We
the People" as its first principle. Nevertheless, it is interesting that each philosophy
is the product of reflection on natural human experience, albeit in reverse ways.
* See FREEMAN, supra note 188, at 1547 (noting how judges make law
regardless of the method of decision).
365 See STEPHEN BREYER, AcTIvE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING A DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 27 (2008) ("[Tlhemes play an important role in a judge's work.").
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should judges only implement values to a certain degree given
their unique role in formulating rules of law? The second
question, intertwined with the first, focuses less on the scope of
the judicial function and more on its content. Indeed, should
judges only emphasize certain values within the system that they
are operating? For example, many of More's decisions, in which
he referred to natural principles of justice, occurred in courts of
equity. In contrast, Supreme Court justices decide cases within a
constitutional framework premised on democratic values and
principles of liberty.
The Constitution of the United States, and the general
principles underlying it, inform the legal system and provide
guidance for answering the first question. The primacy of the
Constitution is simultaneously an unavoidable fact and legal first
principle. The Constitution divides government into three
spheres, and reflecting most state political systems, places
official lawmaking power in the hands of the legislature.3 66
Legislative action is a function of direct and indirect democracy;
elections, procedural and substantive votes, hearings, and other
mechanisms result in democratic outcomes. Similarly, judges
are part of this democratic system, although their role is
different. Judges interpret the laws that come before them in
individual cases.6 8 They cannot avoid "deciding" the meaning of
law. Judicial review is inherent to the judicial function. But the
judicial function is only one aspect of a three-way street guiding
the rule of law.69
The second question cannot be entirely separated from the
first. Judges are bound in the scope of their role as well as the
content they articulate precisely because they are only one part
of a broader constitutional framework that is the product of the
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.").
36 BREYER, supra note 365, at 20-22.
6 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-79 (1803) (discussing
the role ofjudges).
369 The legislature legislates, the executive enforces, and the judiciary interprets
the law. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825) ("The difference
between the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the executive
executes, and the judiciary construes the law.").
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people, who are sovereign in America.'" Thus, the values that
emanate from the people, expressed in written format in the
Constitution, and in unwritten format through collective political
and social democratic action, bind judges and inform their
interpretative methods. The values that judges implement
spring from the values that are part of the legal system itself,
expressed in documents like the Constitution and confirmed by
the democratic actors that author the law.37' These values are
objective once expressed but remain open to change given the
nature of democracy. Their objectivity enables impartiality in
judicial functioning, requires a great deal of prudence, and
provides basis for judicial restraint.372 But because judges are
actors within a democratic system, they are democratic actors
too. They must remain cognizant of the democratic values that
underlie the system in order to contribute to making law
legitimate and acceptable to society.
The most visible and popular example of how judges
implement values is when they engage in statutory
interpretation. Statutory interpretation requires reference to
multiple interpretative tools, including reference to text, purpose,
tradition, stare decisis, consequences, and outcomes, to name a
few. While not exhaustive, the most visible dichotomy is between
those who espouse textualism and those who champion the
significance of context, among other tools. Each method results
in the implementation of values. Textualists impliedly codify
definitions and meanings of words based on first principles of
language;378 judges who recognize the relevance of purpose and
context emphasize underlying values expressed democratically or
in some other political fashion. On the surface, strict textual
interpretation appears to favor stability, which is a value itself.
But logic is not exhaustive, even if it comes through strict
370 The Constitution is a product of "We, the People." See McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 326-29 (1819) (discussing how the Constitution
emanated from a social contract with the people rather than the states separately).
171 See BREYER, supra note 365, at 27 (noting how judges can pay attention to a
"document's democratic theme"). Justice Breyer writes how "so might a judge view
the Constitution through a more democratic lens." Id.
372 See id. at 107 (stating how the American tradition, which he believes
prioritizes "active liberty," "encompasses a particular view of democracy" that calls
for judicial restraint).
373 See id. at 119 ("'[Slubjectivity' is a two-edged criticism, which the literalist
himself cannot escape.").
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textualism. Ironically, given the diversity of human experience,
strict adherence to logic will likely result in instability and
absurdity. Judges should be aware of this reality when acting
judicially. Further, contextualism is not devoid of stability or
totally subject to caprice. This is because reference to purposes
and values that are simultaneously bound and informed by other
more definitive and authoritative democratic actors restrict the
discretion of the judge applying such principles.37 4
Judges should be cognizant of purposes and consequences
when making decisions. This stems from the fact that law is
under-determinate. That fact is unavoidable: The law cannot
account for every situation and fact pattern. Human experience
is too unique. But human communities that organize themselves
according to certain values provide decision-makers with
guidance to prudently apply the unwritten norms to the novel
situations that the law does not reach. Hence, a jurisprudence
that is cognizant of the virtue of prudence is preferable,
especially with specific reference to the values expressed
democratically by the sovereign. Legal development requires
human actors that are aware of how experience informs values
and that are willing to apply those values in concrete situations.
This is what More did, albeit in a different legal system, and
judges today are capable of doing it too. To be sure, judges do not
and should not have unfettered discretion; instead, they must
seek to prudently apply the norms and values approved by other
democratic actors within the same system and through other
processes. Because judges are part of that system, they are
3 For example, Justice Breyer considers the idea of "active liberty," informed
by history and tradition, the dominant value in the American legal system. The
merit of his prioritization of liberty is beyond the scope of this Article. With that
said, I am partial to a presumption of liberty, remaining cognizant of the fact that
there are competing definitions of that term itself. Aquinas' understanding of liberty,
informed by theology, is radically different from John Stuart MVill's principles.
Fortunately, the democratic nature of decision-making in the United States allows
judges to articulate the definition of liberty that is most consistent with the
expressions of democratic actors over time, rather than declaring what the term
means itself. In other words, because Americans choose to live in a regime that
allows "the people" to decide the largest and most significant questions, judges
simply have to figure out what "the people" are saying. To be sure, this is no simple
task, but certainly less audacious. Judges are not required to be philosophers; they
just need to be aware of philosophy and politics in order to properly execute their
role in the implementation of values. This task in a democratic-oriented regime like
the United States is even more interesting when one considers how our
constitutional framework recognizes the legitimacy of individual conscience.
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democratic actors too, and hence inherently competent and
required to implement values. But the pervasiveness of those
values deters subjective judicial decision-making.375
CONCLUSION
Thomas More's legal career, occurring at the time of royal
upheaval within the regime of King Henry VIII, reflects the
contrast between traditional and modern jurisprudence. The
philosophical teachings of Thomas Aquinas serve as the roots of
More's philosophy of law; More's approach to life, virtue,
education, justice, and the purpose of law matches Aquinas on
almost every level.376 His jurisprudence, counseling the
significance of the virtue of prudence in public affairs, contrasts
sharply with intellectual conditions in which he lived as well as
modern jurisprudence. More recognized human law as under-
determinate and limited in scope whereas modern positivism
rejects this approach. More's conception, leaving room for human
action conducted prudently, has no place in modern philosophies
of law, which seek to fill gaps with logic and empiricism while
simultaneously putting natural law to death.
The natural law tradition pervades More's jurisprudence.
Ethics and morality inform, guide, and measure the legitimacy of
positive law. The positive law should reflect and serve the
natural law. As a practicing Catholic, More also viewed eternal
and divine law as binding. 7 An objective notion of good, based
on human nature, also informed human law. These ideas
contrast strongly with Locke, Hume, Bentham, and other modern
philosophers who recognized other first principles as the
foundation of the law, such as freedom, utility, and economics.7
These modern jurisprudential perspectives result in the
permanent separation of law and morals in favor of empirical
pragmatism. The law is less holistic and primarily reactive to
human behavior as observed by scientists. Hence, More's notion
of prudence, namely rightly applying the right principles in a
375 See BREYER, supra note 365, at 114 (noting how "safeguards of objectivity"
remain even when judges account for purpose in legal interpretation).
376 See supra Parts II.C, III.A.
37 See supra Part II.B.
" See supra Part III.B.
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particular situation, lost its relevance with the onset of modern
jurisprudential thinking. Strict logic, rather than prudential
judgment, became primary.
More's philosophy of law leaves room for human freedom,
albeit a different understanding of freedom than modern
philosophy. Modern notions of freedom, growing out of the
Lockean natural rights tradition, and fundamentally atomistic,
serve as the foundation of present-day political regimes, such as
the United States. At the same time, elements of the natural law
tradition remain, although they are by no means primary or
central to the legal system.
But this does not mean that More's legal career and
philosophy of law are not worthy of study. The persistent
reformulation of the natural law tradition, reflected in thinkers
like Finnis, remain in dialogue with legal thinkers like More.
More's career as a judge, pointing to theories of natural justice
while deciding cases, informs analysis of the role of modern
judges. The timeless questions surrounding the role of judges,
especially in a democratic republic, still exist. More's life of
prudence serves as one answer to those questions and therefore
can provide insight into modern jurisprudential inquiries. More
may have been a man "fundamentally ... at odds with his
age."37 9 Eighty years ago, G.K. Chesterton stated that More was
"more important at this moment than at any moment since his
death, even perhaps the great moment of his dying; but he is not
quite so important as he will be in about a hundred years
time."3 80 The same could be said right now. The depth and
breadth of More's legal career, philosophically and practically
born out in his life and death, reflects and contains every
relevant inquiry for the study of law itself. And that is more
than enough reason to study More in every age to come.
319 WILSON, supra note 5, at 235.
3o G.K. Chesterton, A Turning Point in History, in THE FAME OF BLESSED
THOMAS MORE 63, 63 (1929).
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